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Transparency has become a preeminent administrative norm with 
unimpeachable status as a pillar of democracy.2 Over the past several 
decades, nations throughout the world have enacted new laws promising 
a more thoroughly visible, accountable state.3 Academics and think tanks 
have developed and provided support for the claim that information 
disclosure can help solve political and social problems,4 while non-
governmental organizations advocate nationally and transnationally on 
transparency’s behalf.5 No reasonable elected official would publicly 
disavow government openness. 
But the rise of right-wing populism, reminiscent of older forms of 
militaristic authoritarianism,6 threatens transparency’s ascent. Recently 
elected governments in Europe and the Americas represent a counter-
 
 *. Stephen C. O’Connell Professor Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. Many 
thanks to David Pozen and David Fontana for comments on earlier drafts. I am extremely grateful for fine 
research assistance from Zoe Stein, Vanessa Gray, Nyja Brown, and Anne Kelley. 
 2. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THE FIRST 153 (2019) (characterizing transparency as a “theology”); 
Christopher Hood, Transparency in Historical Perspective, in TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER 
GOVERNANCE? 3 (Christopher Hood & David Heald eds., 2006) (“Transparency has attained quasi-
religious significance in debate over governance and institutional design.”).  
 3. See ALASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED OUT: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
15–17 (2006); Greg Michener, FOI Laws Around the World, 22 J. DEMOCRACY 145, 145–46 (2011) 
(describing rapid diffusion of FOI laws since 1990). The U.S. Freedom of Information Act’s influence on 
the global application of transparency has been profound. See David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information 
Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1098–99, 1105–06 (2017) [hereinafter 
Pozen, Freedom]. 
 4. See, e.g., Padideh Ala’I & Robert G. Vaughn, Introduction, to RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
TRANSPARENCY 1 (Padideh Ala’i  & Robert G. Vaughn eds., 2014) (recent collection of academic work 
on national and international transparency laws); THE RIGHT TO KNOW (Ann Florini ed., 2007) (influential 
work on comparative and international transparency policies); ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID 
WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007) (influential work 
evaluating effectiveness of transparency policies). 
 5. See COLIN DARCH & PETER G. UNDERWOOD, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD 51–52, 103 (2010); ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 107–11. 
 6. See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 12–13 (2018) 
(likening the current rise of authoritarianism to Mussolini’s Fascist Italy); YASCHA MOUNK, THE PEOPLE 
VS. DEMOCRACY: WHY OUR FREEDOM IS IN DANGER AND HOW TO SAVE IT 262–64 (2018) (likening the 
current rise of authoritarianism to the Roman Republic). 
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movement away from liberal-democratic institutions that promote the 
visibility and popular accountability that transparency promises.7 Under 
Vladimir Putin, Russia’s expansive state secrecy has enabled widespread 
corruption.8 In Hungary, Victor Orbán’s Fidesz party has consolidated 
power in order to establish what he has called an “illiberal state” that 
limits access to information.9 Brazil’s Jair Bolsanaro, whose election in 
2018 constituted a return to authoritarian right-wing leadership after more 
than a decade of left-wing rule, has reduced government transparency and 
led attacks on independent journalists.10 Even the United States, whose 
fifty-year-old Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)11 has served as a 
model for much of the activism that the age of transparency called forth,12 
 
 7. See JOHN B. JUDIS, THE POPULIST EXPLOSION: HOW THE GREAT RECESSION TRANSFORMED 
AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POLITICS 88–108 (2016); CAS MUDDE & CRISTOBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER, 
POPULISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 62–78 (2017); Jan-Werner Müller, Populism and the People, 
41 LONDON REV. BOOKS 35, 35 (2019), available at https://www.lrb.co.uk/v41/n10/jan-werner-
muller/populism-and-the-people. African populists have demonstrated similar tendencies. See Danielle 
Resnick, The Influence of Populist Leaders on African Democracy, in  THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
GLOBAL POPULISM 267, 268 (Carlos de la Torre ed., 2018) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL 
POPULISM] (discussing lack of transparency in populist South African and Zambian governments). 
 8. See Leanid Kazyrytski, Fighting Corruption in Russia: Its Characteristics and Purpose, 29 
SOC. & L. STUD. 421, 421 (2019), doi:10.1177/0964663919859052; Kenneth Rapoza, In Russia, Putin 
Prefers Secret Government, FORBES (May 19, 2013, 9:19 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/05/19/in-russia-putin-prefers-secret-
government/#61dbfca846d1. The “Panama Papers” leak revealed the extent to which Russian oligarchs 
and state officials secreted money from the country. See Roman Amin, Russia: Banking on Influence, 
ORGANIZED CRIME & CORRUPTION REPORTING PROJECT (June 9, 2016), 
https://www.occrp.org/en/panamapapers/rossiya-putins-bank/. 
 9. See Patrick Kingsley & Benjamin Novak, In Hungary, Viktor Orbán Showers Money on 
Stadiums, Less So on Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/26/world/europe/viktor-orban-soccer-health-care.html (noting that 
Orbán’s “government has weakened accountability and transparency”); see also Lili Bayer, Orbán Rejects 
EPP Concerns on Rule of Law, POLITICO (June 13, 2019, 3:50 PM), 
https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-rejects-epp-concerns-rule-of-law/; Gábor Halmai, 
Illiberalism in East-Central Europe, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE WORKING PAPERS (2019), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3486420; The entanglement of powers: 
How Viktor Orban hollowed out Hungary’s democracy, ECONOMIST (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2019/08/29/how-viktor-orban-hollowed-out-hungarys-democracy. 
 10. See Jessie Bullock, The Bolsonaro Administration Is Quietly Reducing Transparency in Brazil, 
GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Feb. 25, 2019), https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2019/02/25/the-
bolsonaro-administration-is-quietly-reducing-transparency-in-brazil/; Andrew Downie, Bolsonaro is 
making Brazilian journalists' jobs more difficult, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS BLOG (Mar. 21, 
2019, 1:20 PM), https://cpj.org/blog/2019/03/bolsonaro-is-making-brazilian-journalists-jobs-mor.php. 
 11. 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. (2018). 
 12. See Daniel Berliner, Alex Ingrams, & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, The Future of FOIA in an Open 
Government World: Implications of the Open Government Agenda for Freedom of Information Policy 
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has joined this trend under President Donald Trump, whose 
administration proved less than compliant with FOIA and other 
administrative laws and norms.13 
Contemporary populist movements have not, however, entirely 
rejected transparency as an ideal. The populist rebuke of power inequities 
and its advocacy for popular sovereignty implicitly and sometimes 
explicitly includes a demand for a more visible, accessible state.14 Italy’s 
populist Five Star Movement, for example, pledged to form an open 
government by establishing direct communication channels with the 
public,15 while Donald Trump found electoral success in part by 
condemning President Obama16 and Hillary Clinton17 for their secrecy, 
echoing complaints that transparency advocates themselves have made.18 
 
and Implementation, , 63 VILL. L. REV. 867, 867 (2019); Pozen & Schudson, infra  note 150, , at 2–3. 
 13. See infra Part III-A. 
 14. See generally MARGARET CANOVAN, THE PEOPLE 85 (2005) (noting that modern democracy’s 
“sheer complexity offers a standing invitation to populists to insist on returning power to the people, while 
denouncing as undemocratic all complicating institutional and legal structures”); Paula Diehl, Twisting 
Representation, in HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL POPULISM, supra note 6, at 129, 131 (identifying as central to 
populism the embrace of popular sovereignty and denouncing government’s lack of accountability, 
alienation from the people, and failure to represent the people and their interests.”). Left-wing populists 
make similar claims. See Marco Damiani, Radical Left-wing Populism and Democracy in Europe, in 
HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL POPULISM, supra note 6, at 295, 298 (discussing left-wing populist movements 
in Spain and France). 
 15. See Marco Bassini, Rise of Populism and the Five Star Movement Model: An Italian Case 
Study, 11 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. 302, 314, 327 (2019); see also Rogers Brubaker, Why Populism? 46 THEORY 
& SOC. 357, 366 (2017) (discussing communicative strategies among varied populist parties and 
government in Hungary, India, and the Netherlands). 
 16. See, e.g.,  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 6, 2012, 1:31 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/210423753388208128 (“Why is @BarackObama spending 
millions to try and hide his records? He is the least transparent President—ever—and he ran on 
transparency.”); see generally MICHAEL D’ANTONIO, NEVER ENOUGH: DONALD TRUMP AND THE 
PURSUIT OF SUCCESS 284-96 (2015); Kathryn Olmsted, Fringe Paranoia Goes Mainstream, 1 MOD. AM. 
HIST. 243, 245 (2018).  
 17. See Matthew Yglesias, The 2016 Election Really Was Dominated by a Controversy over 
Emails, VOX (Nov. 20, 2018, 9:01 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2016/12/25/14037576/trump-won-because-of-emails; Frank Newport et al., “Email” Dominates 
What Americans Have Heard About Clinton, GALLUP (Sept. 19, 2016), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/195596/email-dominates-americans-heard-clinton.aspx. See also Sven 
Engesser et al., Populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology, 20 INFO. 
COMM. & SOC. 1109, 1117 (2017) (describing populist criticism of lack of transparency by Austrian 
populists). 
 18. See, e.g., Alex Howard, How should history measure the Obama administration’s record on 
transparency?, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Sept. 6, 2016, 12:35 PM), 
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/09/02/how-should-history-measure-the-obama-administrations-
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As a recent book on populism explained, populist movements “tend to 
call for more transparency and the implementation of more democracy . . 
. to break the alleged stranglehold of the elite” when they are out of 
power.19 Upon gaining power, populist leaders have continued to decry 
the secret forces they claim are arrayed against them. Their concerns 
invoke conspiratorial enemies and a “deep state.”20 One could simply 
dismiss populists’ seemingly hypocritical embrace of transparency in the 
face of their resistance to open government mandates as little more than 
a cynical ploy by contemptuous leaders who oppose disclosure of their 
own political and personal dealings in any form.21 This is no doubt at least 
in part true, as right-wing populists generally derogate to second-order 
status (or worse) a concept rooted in liberal democratic theory and good-
government practices.  
But as a governance ideal, transparency has important historical 
connections and conceptual affiliations with populism. It arose from and 
is based on the presumptions that citizens must see the state that not only 
rules but serves them, and that failure to achieve that goal creates a state 
that is illegitimate, inefficient, and corrupt—presumptions that connect 
directly with populism’s normative ideals. A transparent state, however, 
requires laws, regulations, and norms. Grafted onto the modern 
administrative state, the complex rules that impose transparency have 
required their own technocratic bureaucracy to foster compliance and 
enable enforcement. Open government’s detailed, voluminous rules and 
 
record-on-transparency/ (concluding, based on reports from transparency advocacy groups, that Obama 
administration’s record was mixed and failed to meet its promises); Bill Allison, For candidates in 2016, 
transparency is expected, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Mar. 11, 2015, 4:00 PM), 
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2015/03/11/for-candidates-in-2016-transparency-is-expected/ (criticizing 
Clinton for her use of a private email server while conducting official business as Secretary of State).  
 19. Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 6, at 93. 
 20. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 6, 2018, 7:19 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1037661562897682432 (“The Deep State and the Left, and 
their vehicle, the Fake News Media, are going Crazy - & they don’t know what to do.”); Franklin Foer, 
Viktor Orbán’s War on Intellect, ATLANTIC (June 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/06/george-soros-viktor-orban-ceu/588070/ (quoting 
Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán’s warning of an enemy that is “[n]ot open, but hiding; not 
straightforward, but crafty; not honest, but base”). 
 21. See, e.g., Ben Norton, “FOIA Superhero” Launches Campaign to Make Donald Trump's 
Administration Transparent, SALON (Nov. 27, 2016, 8:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2016/11/27/foia-
superhero-launches-campaign-to-make-donald-trumps-administration-transparent (quoting FOIA 
advocate as asserting that “[t]he Trump administration has made it clear that it is entirely hostile to the 
notion of transparency”). 
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the complexity of bureaucratic implementation operate in tension with the 
concept’s populist understanding of a simple, visible state. The 
relationship between transparency and populism, which has not received 
sufficient academic attention,22 illuminates and explains transparency’s 
complicated politics and administrative frustrations in a period of 
renewed populism, as well as in the inevitable reaction against it.  
This Article explains the connections and tensions between 
transparency and populism. Part II introduces populism as a general 
political phenomenon that has emerged and evolved over the past century. 
Shifting between left and right, and occasionally mixing political 
elements in novel ways that are contingent upon their particular historical 
circumstances, populist movements claim to authentically construct and 
then represent an idea of “the people” in opposition to an “elite” power 
bloc. Part III discusses how populism’s complaints about secrecy among 
the elite and powerful overlap with the complaints about secrecy that 
transparency advocates make. Both populists and transparency advocates 
tend to view power and its exercise skeptically,23 and both claim that an 
 
 22. The most significant exception is the anthropologist Kregg Hetherington’s work on the 
relationship between transparency and populism in Paraguay. See KREGG HETHERINGTON, GUERRILLA 
AUDITORS: THE POLITICS OF TRANSPARENCY IN NEOLIBERAL PARAGUAY 189 (2011); Kregg 
Hetherington, Populist Transparency: The Documentation of Reality in Rural Paraguay, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 45, 47 (2008). See also MARK FENSTER, THE TRANSPARENCY FIX: SECRETS, LEAKS, 
AND UNCONTROLLABLE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 37-38 (2017)  (discussing relationship in passing); 
NADIA URBINATI, ME THE PEOPLE: HOW POPULISM TRANSFORMS DEMOCRACY 60-61, 180-83 (2019). 
Instead, commentators and political theorists have described transparency variously: as an essential liberal 
democratic norm and human right that transcends the political, see, e.g., SUZANNE J. PIOTROWSKI, 
GOVERNMENTAL TRANSPARENCY IN THE PATH OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 10 (2007) (“Not only does 
transparency give us a better understanding of what government is doing, but it encourages those who 
work for government to better meet their obligation to us); Patrick Birkinshaw, Transparency as a Human 
Right, in TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? 47 (Christopher Hood & David Heald 
eds., 2006) (“Not only is [freedom of information] instrumentally important in realizing other human 
rights such as freedom of speech and access to justice or other desiderata such as accountability, it is 
intrinsically important: the right to know how government operates on our behalf.”); as a consequentialist 
tool to hold the state accountable and limit corruption, see, e.g., Archon Fung & Stephen Kosack, Does 
Transparency Improve Governance? 17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 65 (2014) (reviewing empirical literature 
on transparency as an accountability tool); as a lever by which parties and politicians impugn incumbents 
and opponents, see text accompanying supra notes 102-105; and as a means used by private actors to 
further commercial and ideological interests. See Margaret Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361 (2016) 
(commercial uses of FOIA); David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 108–
15 (2018). 
 23. Populists view the exercise of power skeptically when they are out of power; transparency 
advocates view the exercise of power especially skeptically when they are dissatisfied with the lack of 
information or candor surrounding its use. 
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increased flow of information and communication enables and even 
encourages political reform by forcing the state to reveal itself. But they 
are not identical. Whereas transparency advocates emphasize technical 
mandates and widely-recognized but unwritten norms of disclosure, 
populists champion simpler political norms and emotional connections 
among leaders, movements, and the public. Transparency is understood 
and promoted in both populist and technocratic registers, and the 
differences between them at times render the concept contradictory, even 
perhaps at times meaningless.  
Part IV uses Donald Trump’s presidential term as a case study in the 
relationship between transparency and populism. It begins by describing 
the extent to which his administration failed to comply with formal 
administrative laws and well-established disclosure norms. Nevertheless, 
the former president and his supporters claim that he in fact governed 
quite transparently24 through his direct, affective public communication 
rather than by complying with the laws and norms of public 
administration. He offered a seemingly accessible version of his thoughts 
and emotions in real time through his Twitter account and his extended, 
often improvisational performances during the rallies he continued to 
hold after his election. Thus, President Trump simultaneously departed 
from administrative laws and norms while repeatedly invoking their 
spirit, and in the process sought to reframe transparency’s meaning in 
terms more favorable to his manner of governance. 
Part V concludes by explaining how right-wing populism’s rise has laid 
bare transparency’s internal conflict between its status as an 
administrative concept defined and implemented by law, regulations, and 
norms, and its operation as a contested political concept that overlaps with 
populism. The tension between these distinct ways of understanding 
transparency clarifies both transparency’s politics and its limitations and 
disappointments. 
II.  POPULISM: THE PEOPLE AGAINST THE ELITE 
Populism has regularly waxed and waned as a prominent political force 
 
 24. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 24, 2019, 9:47 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1121048120312389634 (“No Collusion, No Obstruction - 
there has NEVER been a President who has been more transparent.”). 
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since its formal emergence in the U.S. during the late 19th century,25 
despite the apocalyptic dangers to democracy its critics regularly predict 
will follow in populism’s wake.26 It continues to play a key role in the 
modern political understanding of popular sovereignty27 and has regained 
its standing in the last decade. In the U.S. for example, populist ideas 
circulated in the Tea Party’s insurgency among the Republican base 
during the Obama presidency, the Occupy Wall Street movement on the 
political Left, beginning in 2011, and then among both Democrats and 
Republicans in the 2016 election.28 Right-wing populism’s current rise in 
European nations began well before the 2016 U.S. presidential election.29 
Left-wing populist parties have been successful in Greece and Spain,30 
and populism has been a constant and prevalent strain of Latin American 
politics since the previous century.31 Despite scholars’ normative 
disagreement over populism’s significance, I explain in this Part, the 
academic literature has reached a general consensus about certain of its 
characteristics.32 
 
 25. Judis, supra note 6, at 18–19. 
 26. See, e.g., WILLIAM GALSTON, ANTI-PLURALISM: THE POPULIST THREAT TO LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 4-5 (2018) (characterizing populism as a “deformation of liberal democracy” and 
symptomatic of the latter’s “worrying retreat”); JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 6 (2016) 
(criticizing populism as “blatantly antidemocratic” and a “degraded form of democracy”); Aziz Z. Huq, 
The People Against the Constitution, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1140-44 (2018). 
 27. Duncan Kelly, Populism and the History of Popular Sovereignty, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
POPULISM  511, 529 (Cristóbal Rovia Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2017).  
 28. Judis, supra note 6, at 53–87. 
 29. Europe’s surge in populism predated the current reemergence in the U.S. See generally 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY POPULISM: THE SPECTRE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY (Daniele 
Albertazzi & Duncan McDonnell eds., 2008); CAS MUDDE, POPULISM IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS 
(2012); CAS MUDDE, POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE (2007). 
 30. See Alexandros Kioupkiolis, Podemos: The Ambiguous Promises of Left-Wing Populism in 
Contemporary Spain, 21 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 99 (2016); Marco Lisi et al., Economic Crisis and the Variety 
of Populist Response: Evidence from Greece, Portugal and Spain, 42 W. EURO. POL. 1284 (2019); Yannis 
Stavrakakis & Giorgos Katsambekis, Left-Wing Populism in the European Periphery: The Case of 
SYRIZA, 21 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 119 (2014).  
 31. See MICHAEL L. CONNIFF ET AL., POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA (Michael L. Conniff ed., 2d 
ed. 2012); CARLOS DE LA TORRE, POPULIST SEDUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 2010). 
 32. The academic literature on populism reflects populism’s tendency to fluctuate in importance. 
See generally CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION 6–9 (2009) (offering an historiography of the 
literature). One can find an enormous range of hand-wringing critiques of populism as an historical 
phenomenon and more focused, limited embraces of certain aspects of populist politics and the history of 
populist movements, usually reflecting the commentator’s political commitments. Compare JOHN 
LUKACS, DEMOCRACY AND POPULISM: FEAR AND HATRED (2005) (condemning populism’s key role in 
all of the destructive political movements and events of the 20th Century), with John B. Judis, Rethinking 
7
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A.  Populism’s Dualist Vision 
Current and past populist movements tend to share strong but thin 
political commitments. Most significantly, they promote deep-seated, 
dualist visions of the political and social world, on one side of which 
stands the “people” that a movement calls into existence and whose 
interests it claims to champion. On the other side is the existing structure 
of power and the power bloc that controls it.33 This dualism reduces 
political debate and noise to simple binaries between vague, undefinable 
categories.34 Populist movements and leaders promise to transform the 
political and social order by restoring the people (in whatever way they 
are defined) to their rightful place in power and moral authority through 
self-rule. What was once broken will be repaired; the people that had been 
divided will find a unified wholeness under their own direct rule. 
Populism’s foundational division between people and the power bloc 
produces three additional binaries that lend specificity and definition to 
each populist movement.35 The first is that the power bloc represents the 
interests of an “elite.”36 Individual movements fill this vague category 
distinctly. Right-wing populists generally define the elites they oppose in 
intellectual and cultural terms, while left-wing populists tend to 
concentrate their hostility on economic elites.37 The population of these 
elites may overlap, but different kinds of populist movements condemn 
elites for perpetrating different wrongs. Second, populist movements 
 
Populism, DISSENT 16 (Fall 2016) (describing populism, and political theories of populism, as a positive 
development), and CHANTAL MOUFFE, FOR A LEFT POPULISM (2018) (embracing populism for a renewed 
left politics).  Social scientists and political theorists provide a less normative, more descriptive account 
of populism’s development and effects. See JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH (rev. ed. 1998); 
MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6; MÜLLER, supra note 6; Margaret Canovan, Trust the People! 
Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, 47 POL. STUD. 2 (1999); POPULISM: ITS MEANING AND 
NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS (Ghita Ionescu & Ernest Gellner eds., 1969); OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
POPULISM (Cristóbal Rovia Kaltwasser et al., eds., 2017); POPULISM AND THE MIRROR OF DEMOCRACY 
(Francisco Panizza ed., 2005). 
 33. Canovan, supra note 31, at 3–4. 
 34. See generally ERNESTO LACLAU, ON POPULIST REASON 18 (2005) (explaining that populist 
reason “simplifies the political space, replacing a complex set of differences and determinations by a stark 
dichotomy whose two poles are necessarily imprecise”). 
 35. See MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6; MÜLLER, supra note 25, at 19–22. 
 36. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6, at 11–14; MÜLLER, supra note 25, at 2–3;Canovan, 
supra note xx, at 3–4. 
 37. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note XX, at 12–13; MÜLLER, supra note xx, at 2–3; Canovan, 
supra note 31, at 3–4. 
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express deep skepticism about pluralism as a political theory and about 
pluralistic governance as a preeminent institutional and procedural 
principle.38 This binary rests on a deep suspicion of governing 
institutions, including the state, civil service, and political parties, which 
appear structurally and inevitably unjust to unprivileged commoners.39 
Electoral contests too appear unfair or even fixed. Third, the boundary 
between people and the power bloc radiates from some defined identity, 
drawn in terms of nation, race/ethnicity, masculinity, class, or some 
combination thereof. The idea of a “people” draws categorical boundaries 
between those who are within and outside of the group, in the process 
shaping the individual and group ideal of the people whose interests the 
movement would further.40  
B.  Populism’s Claim to Authenticity 
Populist movements contend that the existing power bloc fails to 
represent the legitimate majority’s true interests.41 At its core, populism’s 
anti-elitism rejects what it views as the hidden nature of the present 
institutional order.42 Bureaucracies that operate and communicate in a 
technocratic manner—relying on their expertise as authority, engaging in 
complex but facially fair procedures, and communicating in dry, neutral 
language—appear especially suspect when contrasted with a populist 
 
 38. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6, at 7–8; MÜLLER, supra note 25, at 3. 
 39. LACLAU, supra note 33, at 137; Kenneth M. Roberts, Populism and Political Powers, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM, supra note 31, at 287, 289–90. 
 40. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6, at 18–19; MÜLLER, supra note 25, at 3–4. Current right-
wing populist movements have tended to emphasize national identity as their core principle, but they often 
tie their idea of nationhood to race, ethnicity, and ideology as well. As Benjamin De Cleen has argued, 
populism and nationalism are not coextensive, and just as not all populists are nationalists, so not all 
nationalists are populists. See Populism and Nationalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM, supra 
note 31, at 342, 358–59.  
 41. Populism’s theory of representation presumes that distance and intermediation necessarily 
interfere with popular sovereignty and therefore prevent the people’s rule. For more complex theories of 
representation, see, for example, HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967) (the 
canonical consideration of the issue in political theory); Mónica Brito Vieira, Introduction to RECLAIMING 
REPRESENTATION : CONTEMPORARY ADVANCES IN THE THEORY OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
(Mónica Brito Vieira ed., 2017) (providing a history and literature review of representation as a concept 
in political theory). 
 42. See EDWARD SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY 44-47 (1956); Yannis Papadopoulos, 
Populism, the Democratic Question, and Contemporary Governance, in DEMOCRACIES AND THE 
POPULIST CHALLENGE 45, 47, 57 (Yves Mény & Yves Surel eds., 2002).  
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style that appeals directly to the people in plain, emotional language.43 
Any legislative and executive institutions that would illegitimately 
buttress state authority while falsely claiming to represent the people do 
so without the people’s knowledge or approval. 
Populist movements make two promises to correct this problem: they 
pledge to remove the distance between the people and state by offering a 
truer form of representation, one that authentically pursues the public’s 
real interests by respecting the people’s sovereignty;44 and they promise 
to banish anything hidden from the public that would interfere with this 
newly direct, redemptive relationship between state and public.45 The 
people will rule themselves through their authentic representative(s).46 
Benjamin Arditi has characterized populism’s ability to engage “an 
imaginary identification” among movement followers that feels direct and 
unmediated.47 The charismatic leadership that populist movements 
typically rally around helps to create such identification, allowing one or 
a small number of leaders to represent and speak for the whole, in the 
process establishing popular loyalty to the leader and group.48 The 
immediacy of these feelings, apparent in followers’ evident devotion to 
the populist cause or leader at gatherings and rallies, demonstrates what 
Chantal Mouffe has identified as the “passions” of collective populist 
identity—passions that existing political institutions consider suspect and 
prevent from expression.49 Populist movements often appear insurgent 
 
 43. BENJAMIN MOFFITT, THE GLOBAL RISE OF POPULISM: PERFORMANCE, POLITICAL STYLE, AND 
REPRESENTATION 43–47 (2016); Paul Taggart, Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics, in 
DEMOCRACIES AND THE POPULIST CHALLENGE 62, 76-77 (Yves Mény & Yves Surel eds., 2002). 
 44. See URBINATI, supra note 21, at 8-9. On the role of this ideal of the people in early U.S. 
populist movements, see LAWRENCE GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST MOVEMENT IN 
AMERICA (1976) ; MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2017). On its 
role in 20th Century French and Russian populist movements, see KEVIN PASSMORE, THE RIGHT IN 
FRANCE FROM THE THIRD REPUBLIC TO VICHY (2012); FRANCO VENTURI, ROOTS OF REVOLUTION: A 
HISTORY OF THE POPULIST AND SOCIALIST MOVEMENTS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY RUSSIA (1960). 
 45. CANOVAN, supra note 13, at 89-90. 
 46. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6, at 68. 
 47. Benjamin Arditi, Populism, or, Politics at the Edges of Democracy, 9 CONTEMP. POL. 17, 23 
(2003). 
 48. See PAUL TAGGART, POPULISM 100–03 (2000); on “charismatic leadership” generally, see 
MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 242-44 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968).a 
 49. Chantal Mouffe, The “End of Politics” and the Challenge of Right-Wing Populism, in 
POPULISM AND THE MIRROR OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 31, at 50, 51. See also Pierre Manent, Populist 
Demagogy and the Fanaticism of the Center, AM. AFF. (Summer 2017), available at 
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/05/populist-demagogy-and-the-fanaticism-of-the-center/ (“The 
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and angry at the economic and social conditions under which their 
followers claim to suffer, and their members invest themselves 
emotionally in both the identity that the group has constructed and in the 
movement’s leadership.50 
Whether embodied in an individual or dispersed within a party or 
movement, populist leadership claims to constitute true representation for 
a singular people.51 Leaders express the popular will simply and starkly, 
often through direct, performative mediated address to a mass audience 
that takes advantage of their stature and celebrity.52 They traffic in 
stereotypes, emphasize action, and offer what they propose as “common 
sense” solutions rather than technical or abstract ones.53 Indeed, their 
claim to truly represent the people in opposition to an elite establishment 
invites them to exercise ostensibly bad manners, creating offense by 
speaking bluntly and outrageously.54 Populists channel the popular will 
by attempting to speak in the people’s voice more honestly and bravely 
than the people themselves. 
Populism is therefore not merely a group response to external stimuli 
(such as an economic crisis), but a political and cultural style that is 
creatively syncretic.55 Populist movements link together shared (if not 
 
populist orientation is often said to have a ‘passionate,’ ‘extreme,’ or ‘irresponsible’ manner and tone. But 
its content, too, is never credited with the characteristics of reason, moderation, and responsibility. The 
term ‘populism’ denotes an orientation, a political opinion, or certain orientations or political opinions, 
which are discredited and denounced.”). 
 50. See Canovan, supra note 31, at 6. 
 51. See MÜLLER supra note 25, at 20–23; SHILS, supra note 41, at 98–104. 
 52. MOFFITT, supra note 42, at 84–87 (2016); Julianne Stewart et al., Conclusion: Power to the 
Media Managers, in THE MEDIA AND NEO-POPULISM: A CONTEMPORARY COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 217, 
228 (Gianpetro Mazzoleni, Julianne Stewart & Bruce Horsfeld eds., 2003). On the global rise of celebrity-
politicians, and their relationship to populism, see generally DARRELL M. WEST & JOHN ORMAN, 
CELEBRITY POLITICS (2003); MARK WHEELER, CELEBRITY POLITICS: IMAGE AND IDENTITY IN 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS (2013); David Marsh, Paul ’t Hart & Karen Tindall, 
Celebrity Politics: The Politics of the Late Modernity, 8 POL. STUD. REV. 322 (2010). 
 53. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 6, at 68. 
 54. BENJAMIN ARDITI, POLITICS ON THE EDGES OF LIBERALISM: DIFFERENCE, POPULISM, 
REVOLUTION, AGITATION 78 (2007) (characterizing the populist leader’s role as that of a “drunken dinner 
guest”); Moffitt, supra note 42, at 57–63; see generally Pierre Ostiguy, Populism: A Socio-Cultural 
Approach, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM, supra note 31, at 73, 77–84 (discussing the 
important tendency of populist leaders to deploy “low” social and political means of address to the public); 
J. Eric Oliver & Wendy Rahn, Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election, 667 ANNALS OF 
THE AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 189, 192–94 (2016). 
 55. See Canovan, supra note 31, at 4–5 (noting populism’s affirmative as well as reactive 
tendencies); MOFFITT, supra note 42, at 50–51.  
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necessarily correct) understandings of the past, criticisms of present 
conditions, and visions of the future to form a new political framework 
built upon issues that dominant parties and institutional politics ignore or 
fail to acknowledge fully. Their invocation of a “people” is at once 
affirmative, insofar as it builds a constituency through a collective 
identity, and oppositional, since in doing so it excludes those outside the 
group and constructs an enemy that seeks both to protect its status as 
“elite” and to relegate the people to subservience.56 At bottom, populist 
movements intend to redeem and remake the world in the people’s image 
(as they would define it), under the people’s rule, led by the people’s 
authentic representative(s).57 They promise a state that will serve directly, 
instrumentally, and affectively in the people’s interest—whoever that 
people is, and whatever that people purportedly wants. 
C.  Populism’s Contingency 
Populism’s Manichean vision and simple narrative—the identifiable 
people in pitched battle against a power bloc that controls the existing, 
seemingly democratic institutions—render it so vague as to be seemingly 
meaningless as a political idea.58 Individual populist movements can 
incline left or right, or offer a mix of proposals from different points on 
the present political spectrum; they can also evolve in directions 
seemingly opposite from where they started, especially once they find 
success, while remaining true to the basic storyline they convey.59 And 
the narratives they offer appear to pull in opposite directions, driven by 
an internal tension between populism’s claims to offer radical change or 
revolutionary transformation and its defense of a nationalist identity or 
cherished, long-lost political principles. The emergence and development 
of any movement therefore proves highly contingent on a nation’s or 
region’s internal political dynamics—including its political system and 
 
 56. LACLAU, supra note 33, at 18; Canovan, supra note 31, at 4–5. 
 57. On populism as constituting a strong form of democracy’s “redemptive” face, see Canovan, 
supra note 31, at 9–14. 
 58. See MÜLLER supra note 25, at 8–10. 
 59. See MOUFFE, supra note 31, at 11. Examples in the U.S. of figures who have individually 
shifted from positions typically recognized as leftist to those understood as right-wing include William 
Jennings Bryant, Tom Watson, and Father Charles Coughlin. See MICHAEL KAZIN, A GODLY HERO: THE 
LIFE OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYANT (2006); KAZIN, POPULIST PERSUASION, supra note 43, at 40–46, 74-
80. 
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parties—as well as on the current issues to which an individual movement 
appears to be responding.60 This is equally true on different continents, as 
the populism of North and South America differ considerably from that 
of Europe, reflecting distinctions in political cultures, respective histories 
as colonialists and colonies, and their relative states of economic 
development.61  
As a result, populism does not function as a freestanding political 
concept in the manner of socialism, fascism, or neoliberalism, each of 
which at least appear to sit somewhere on the political spectrum and stand 
for something (even if their boundaries and substance might be 
contested).62 Putative populist movements either operate within or find 
themselves labeled as part of the political institutions and traditions that 
they criticize. Among conservatives, “right-wing populists” and so-called 
“authoritarian populists” distinguish themselves from elite or Burkean 
conservatives.63 The “populist left” stands in opposition to the drift among 
leftists and liberals towards neoliberalism and centrism.64 At the same 
time that they radically challenge institutional parties, right- and left-wing 
populists can draw from the same pool of disaffected voters. In the 2016 
presidential election, for example, Donald Trump’s populist claims to 
represent forgotten populations attracted at least some of those who had 
backed Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primaries, despite the stark 
 
 60. See generally David Fontana, Unbundling Populism, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1482, 1488–94 (2018) 
(discussing what he terms “unbundled populism,” which is free of the “worldviews” of a particular 
moment). 
 61. See OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM, supra note 31 (highlighting the connections and 
comparative distinctions and departures among the populist governments and movements in different 
nations and on different continents); see also Carlos de la Torre, Populism in Latin America, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF POPULISM, supra note 31, at 195, 196–203 (describing wide variety of populist movements 
and leaders in Latin America). 
 62. See Canovan, supra note 31, at 4 (noting populism’s contingency and rejecting the notion of a 
populist “ideology”). 
 63. See, e.g., CHIP BERLET & MATTHEW LYONS, RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN AMERICA: TOO 
CLOSE FOR COMFORT (2000) (on the rise of right-wing populism in the 1990s); STUART HALL, THE HARD 
ROAD TO RENEWAL: THATCHERISM AND THE CRISIS OF THE LEFT 39-56 (1988) (on the rise of 
“authoritarian populism” in the 1980s in the US under Ronald Reagan and in the UK under Margaret 
Thatcher).  
 64. See, e.g., MOUFFE, supra note 31 (arguing that to be relevant and recapture the ground lost to 
authoritarian populism and neoliberalism, the left should embrace a form of democratic populism); 
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN TIMES OF AUSTERITY: BRINGING CAPITALISM BACK 
INTO PROTEST ANALYSIS 96–102 (2015) (discussing Occupy Wall Street and other recent left populist 
movements).  
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divergence in their stances on particularly salient policy issues.65  
This suggests that populism operates as a performative, rhetorical 
practice, which allows different populist movements to share common 
tropes while they articulate distinct political demands tied to the time and 
place of their emergence.66 As the British sociologist Peter Worsley 
explained, populism operates as “a dimension of political culture in 
general, not simply as a particular kind of overall ideological system or 
type of organization.”67 Viewed as a contingent political phenomenon 
based on a set of vague but powerful binaries, populism is ultimately less 
a political program than a “style,”68 a political rhetoric,”69 or a “mode of 
political representation”70 that movements can appropriate to fit a given 
set of concerns that are being ignored and to rally a segment of the 
population that feels disregarded. 
III.  TRANSPARENCIES: A TECHNICAL, POLITICAL, AND POPULIST NORM 
Like populism, government transparency is not simply one thing. 
Everyone on the present political spectrum appears to embrace it as an 
administrative norm (at least in theory), while its precise political valence 
has evolved over the past five decades.71 Most broad historical and 
theoretical accounts of transparency associate its rise with progressive 
 
 65. PIPPA NORRIS & RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURAL BACKLASH: TRUMP, BREXIT, AND 
AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM 67-68 (2019); Danielle Kurtzleben, Here’s How Many Bernie Sanders 
Supporters Ultimately Voted For Trump, NPR (Aug. 24, 2017, 2:53 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/08/24/545812242/1-in-10-sanders-primary-voters-ended-up-supporting-
trump-survey-finds (reporting data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study finding that 12% 
of those who had voted for Sanders in the Democratic primaries voted for Trump in the general election).  
 66. See MOFFITT, supra note 42, at 104–08 (characterizing populism’s invocation of “the people” 
as performance); see generally MICHAEL SEWARD, THE REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM (2010) (emphasizing 
the role of aesthetic and cultural components and an ongoing performance engaged in by a representative 
to gain acceptance by a public).  
 67. Peter Worsley, The Concept of Populism, in POPULISM: ITS MEANING AND NATIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 31, at 212, 245.   
 68. Benjamin Moffit & Simon Tormey, Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political 
Style, 62 POL. STUD. 381, 390-92 (2014). 
 69. KAZIN, POPULIST PERSUASION, supra note 43 , at 192–93. 
 70. Arditi, supra note 46, at 78–87. 
 71. See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE RISE OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW: POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF 
TRANSPARENCY, 1945-1975, at 4 (2015) (“Right, left, and center, there is broad support for the ideal of 
transparency.”) 
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good governance reforms,72 although specific chronicles of open 
government legislation in particular jurisdictions note that party politics 
and interbranch conflicts often motivate new transparency reforms.73 
Taken together, these accounts demonstrate that “transparency” is neither 
an essentially progressive, partisan, nor libertarian administrative norm—
although elements of each have both structured the norm historically and 
occasionally emerged to dominate advocacy efforts. Nevertheless, the 
term’s political and symbolic authority allows the transparency ideal to 
transcend political partisanship and to take on different meanings based 
on context and on those who claim its mantle.  
This Part considers transparency’s multiple meanings and applications. 
It first identifies transparency’s prescription in the laws and norms that 
attempt to open a sprawling bureaucracy to view. Open government laws 
inevitably prove long, complicated, and legalistic, and require continual 
enhancement and enforcement against the vast complex of government 
entities that make up the modern state.74 This legal and normative 
machinery constitutes transparency’s technocratic arrangement—the 
means by which the state is made accessible, legitimate, and above all 
democratic through a set of technical rules.75 Then this Part turns to 
transparency as a concept that both needs political support and is part of 
partisan and institutional conflict. Finally, this Part argues that, in the 
process of its political use, transparency’s populist elements can 
predominate and undercut its technocratic implementation. 
 
 72. See David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 108–15 (2018) 
[hereinafter Pozen, Drift]. 
 73. For monographs that discuss the politics of freedom of information laws in individual 
countries, see, for example, SCHUDSON, supra note 70, at 37–63 (on the U.S.); BEN WORTHY, THE 
POLITICS OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: HOW AND WHY GOVERNMENTS PASS LAWS THAT THREATEN 
THEIR POWER 9–11 (2017) (U.K.); and PRASHANT SHARMA, DEMOCRACY AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE 
INDIAN STATE (2015). 
 74. On FOIA’s many amendments over the past fifty years, for example, see Sami Kerzel, FOIA: 
Then and Now, DOCUMENTS TO THE PEOPLE, Winter 2016, at 22, available at 
https://journals.ala.org/index.php/dttp/article/view/6226/8103. 
 75. The distinction I pose here between transparency’s technocratic and populist conception 
parallels Jack Balkin’s use of progressivism and populism as “ideal” types in constitutional theory. J.M. 
Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935, 1944 (1995). My 
use of the terms is not concerned with theory so much as its application: the technocratic effort to develop 
and enforce rules and the deployment of populist rhetoric and ideas by historical actors. I situate my 
account of transparency’s technocratic side within the concept’s development as an administrative norm 
and my account of populism within its development in U.S. political history. 
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A.  Technocratic Transparency: Open Government as an Administrative 
Norm 
Sprawling both organizationally and spatially, modern government 
resists visibility. Open government laws cannot magically and perfectly 
unveil the state; rather, they can only address the traces of state operations 
through legislation that attempts to mitigate bureaucracies’ inevitable 
information hoarding.76 The disclosure of federal government records in 
the U.S., for example, is mandated by a variety of laws, including the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), while sub-federal states have their 
own analogous but also quite distinct and variable laws.77 Various 
preservation statutes require that these records are maintained and 
archived.78 Open government laws create specific exemptions from 
disclosure for certain types of records.79 Federal and state laws require 
meetings to be open to the public, although the scope of these laws varies 
widely among the various statutes and state constitutions that establish 
the mandates.80 Administrative laws that regulate agency rulemaking and 
adjudication require the disclosure of some government outputs that have 
legal effect, as well as some of the inputs government produce and relies 
upon to produce them.81 None of these laws are mechanical. Rather, each 
relies upon broad, ambiguous standards and multi-factor balancing tests 
established in complex statutes and court decisions.82  
 
 76. See DAVID BEETHAM, BUREAUCRACY 101-02 (2d ed. 1996); 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND 
SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 992 1968). 
 77. See Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617, 643–
47 (2010) [hereinafter Fenster, Seeing the State]. 
 78. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018); Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. 
§ 3301 et seq. (2018) (requiring creation, maintenance, and retention of records); FLA. STAT. § 119.01 et 
seq. (2018) (Florida’s open records law). 
 79. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2018) (enumerating exceptions from disclosure requirements to 
federal FOIA); FLA. STAT. § 119.071 (2019) (enumerating general exemptions from disclosure of public 
records). 
 80. See, e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 and 39 U.S.C. (1976)) (federal open meetings law); FLA. CONST. art. 
I, § 24 (providing individual right of access to public records and meetings); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 
et seq. (Ralph M. Brown Act, California’s open meetings law). 
 81. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2018) (requiring federal agencies conducting informal 
rulemaking to publish proposed rules in Federal Register and to incorporate in the final rules “a concise 
general statement of their basis and purpose”). 
 82. For examples of contested, ambiguous language in open government laws, consider two of the 
most recent FOIA decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court, which settled long-disputed language in FOIA 
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The federal versions of these laws in the U.S. focus on the executive 
branch.83 But the President and White House (which enjoy certain 
constitutional privileges from disclosure84) and federal agencies represent 
only part of a much broader set of U.S. leviathans. By Constitution and 
statute, the U.S. Congress85 and federal Judiciary86 face their own sets of 
more limited disclosure requirements. And private entities and 
individuals interact extensively with U.S. government entities, whether 
by performing governmental duties or finding themselves subject to 
regulatory enforcement. Open government laws vary in how they resolve 
the difficult issue of when the public nature of the work that private 
entities and public-private partnerships perform and their interactions 
with the state compels disclosure.87 State constitutions and statutes handle 
these same issues distinctly, while the federal constitution establishes 
only a minimal baseline of disclosure requirements and rights of access.88 
 
exemptions. See generally Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2366 (2019) (settling 
the meaning of FOIA § 552(b)(4) exempting “commercial or financial information obtained from a person 
and . . . confidential”); Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011) (settling the meaning of FOIA 
§ 552(b)(2) exempting material “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency”). 
On the contested definition of the “record” for purposes of litigation under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, see Aram A. Gavoor & Steven A. Platt, Administrative Records and the Courts, 67 KAN. L. REV. 1 
(2018). Statutory vagueness often leads courts to defer to agency decisions not to disclose records. See 
Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 163–68 (2006); Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 211 
(2013); Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
679, 719 (2002).  
 83. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018) (applying FOIA only to “each agency,” which is defined in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 551(1) to exclude, among other entities, Congress and the courts). 
 84. Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial 
Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 933–41 (2006). 
 85. See Fenster, Seeing the State, supra note 76, at 637–38 (2010); Adrian Vermeule, The 
Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 410–22 (2004). 
 86. See Fenster, Seeing the State, supra note 76, at 641-42; Marci A. Hamilton & Clemens G. 
Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of Information Flow: How the Constitution Constructs the Pathways of 
Information, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.  267, 289–93 (2003). 
 87. See generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Landyn Wm. Rookard, Private Government and the 
Transparency Deficit, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 437, 446-49 (2019) (discussing FOIA’s limitations in when 
government privatizes or works with private actors); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the 
Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 894–97 (2014) (examining the problem facing efforts to apply the 
APA and FOIA to hybrid, “boundary” agencies). 
 88. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (holding that the First Amendment provides 
no general “right of access to all sources of information within government control”); see generally 
Fenster, Seeing the State, supra note 76, at 641–43 (identifying limited federal constitutional rights of 
access to information and the variability of rights created by state constitutions). 
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In sum, transparency in the U.S. and elsewhere has proven difficult to 
legislate and enforce.89 Its imposition has required complex laws that 
parse fine distinctions in order to balance competing interests. Attorneys 
and professionals have developed special expertise for those representing 
the public and government.90 Officials who oversee government records 
receive compliance training,91 and some statutes excuse agencies from 
fee-shifting provisions if they acted in good faith in implementing a 
complex, often ambiguous statute.92 Legislators, officials, attorneys, and 
courts must resolve the highly technical questions these laws and their 
interpretations create.93 Transparency is imposed at a level far removed 
from the eyes and ears of the public, in government and legal offices and 
 
 89. See generally WORTHY, supra note 72, at 12-14 (describing the clash between transparency’s 
symbolic value and the institutions that the implementing laws affect). 
 90. Although numerous websites, including the federal government’s own FOIA.gov, assist 
laypersons in filing an initial request, the process becomes increasingly complex when an agency denies 
a request either in part of whole. A how-to guide produced and posted on the Internet by the National 
Security Archive (an NGO that extensively uses FOIA) warns that as a requester moves through the 
administrative appeals process following a full or partial denial from an agency, it will need an increasing 
amount of legal knowledge and should seek representation if she decides to file suit. NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE, 
EFFECTIVE FOIA REQUESTING FOR EVERYONE 29–51 (2008), available at 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//nsa/foia/foia_guide/foia_guide_full.pdf; see also id. at 52 (“Bringing a 
lawsuit requires a commitment of time and resources. . . . Although you may litigate a case without an 
attorney, it may be difficult to make an impact on your own if you are not familiar with case law and court 
procedures.). FOIA litigation requires attorneys themselves to develop special expertise. For example, 
courts have developed special rules to assist them in ruling on summary judgment motions in FOIA 
litigation. See Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (explaining rules 
developed in response to the “peculiar nature of the FOIA”); cf. Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of 
Information Act Trial, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 217, 227 (2011) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing law and 
fact issues in FOIA litigation and complaining that courts regularly decide FOIA cases on summary 
judgment, using the procedure they have developed, despite the dominance of contested fact questions in 
their decision). 
 91. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(j), (j)(2)(F) (2018) (requiring federal agencies to create a “Chief 
FOIA Officer” and mandating that the official “offer training” to personnel regarding their duties under 
FOIA); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1376.01(a) (2019) (establishing ombudsman to help train agencies 
on their responsibilities under state public access law). 
 92. See Heath Hooper & Charles N. Davis, A Tiger with No Teeth: The Case for Fee Shifting in 
State Public Records Law, 79 MO. L. REV. 949, 959–63 (2014). 
 93. Examples of the narrow, highly technical legal issues that consume FOIA practitioners include 
two of the Supreme Court’s most recent FOIA decisions, in which the Court reversed longstanding circuit 
court interpretations of two different disclosure exemptions. See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 
139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019)  (overruling the D.C. Circuit’s longstanding, influential interpretation of 
“privileged or confidential” in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) from National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 
498 F.2d 765, 767 (1974)); Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 570-71 (2011) (overruling the D.C. 
Circuit’s longstanding, influential interpretation of “personnel” in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) from Crooker v. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc)). 
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in courtrooms, as a specialized, complex, internal project led by specially-
trained experts.  
The extent of these mandates’ impacts proves difficult to judge, given 
the abstract goals that the norm is intended to meet and the challenge of 
measuring its benefits and costs. As a public administration scholar who 
specializes in transparency has recently noted, its impact will at best prove 
“gradual, indirect, and diffuse.”94 This is especially true given both the 
difficulty in evaluating the causal effects of a broad administrative norm 
imposed by narrowly applied, technical legal mandates,95 and the hazy, 
uneven relationship between transparency and government 
accountability.96 Moreover, some studies have found evidence that 
transparency can demoralize the public as much as it leads them to 
participate knowledgeably in democratic elections.97 Critics have more 
recently argued that open government laws have been crippled by 
underfunding and insufficient compliance98 and that transparency has 
been turned into a corporatist anti-regulatory tool.99 One prominent legal 
academic has even argued that FOIA has come to constitute a fetish object 
 
 94. Gregory Michener, Gauging the Impact of Transparency Policies, 79 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 136 
(2019) [hereinafter Michener, Gauging the Impact]. 
 95. See Maria Cuccinello et al., 25 Years of Transparency Research: Evidence and Future 
Directions, 77 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 32 (2017); see also Jenny De Fine Licht et al., When Does Transparency 
Generate Legitimacy? Experimenting on a Context‐Bound Relationship, 27 GOVERNANCE 111 (2014) 
(noting the important role that political and administrative context plays in the impact of transparency 
policies on institutional legitimacy). 
 96. See Jonathan Fox, The Uncertain Relationship Between Transparency and Accountability, 17 
DEV. IN PRAC. 663, 668-69 (2007). 
 97. See, e.g., Monika Bauhr & Marcia Grimes, Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of 
Transparency for Societal Accountability, 27 GOVERNANCE 291, 309-11 (2014) (noting that under certain 
conditions, exposure of corruption can lead the public to despair rather than to hold state actors 
accountable); see generally BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL 
REFORM QUANDARY 67 (2015) (arguing that transparency can undercut trust in electoral democracy). 
 98. See generally Margaret Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361 (2016) (showing how use of 
FOIA by for-profit requesters crowds out more traditional and intended requests); Pozen, Freedom, supra 
note 2, at 1124–25 (discussing congressional underfunding of agency compliance efforts); Daxton R. 
“Chip” Stewart & Charles N. Davis, Bringing Back Full Disclosure: A Call for Dismantling FOIA, 21 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 515, 517–18 (2016) (characterizing FOIA as “petrified” and “a tool for preserving 
secrecy”). 
 99. See Pozen, Drift, supra note 71, at 123–46; Jeannine E. Relly & Carol B. Schwalbe, How 
business lobby networks shaped the U.S. Freedom of Information Act: An examination of 60 years of 
congressional testimony, 33 GOV. INFO. Q. 404 (2016). 
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that clogs rather than assists in executive branch administration.100 No 
matter the extent of critique of the general concept and its technocratic 
mandate, transparency viewed this way attempts to marginally increase 
the state’s visibility through intermittently effective regulations on 
government behavior.101 
B.  Political Transparency: Open Government as a Political Norm 
Although an administrative and technocratic norm, transparency is 
also deployed politically, and in that guise is made to speak in a distinct 
register. Candidates, parties, and elected officials use both their 
opponents’ alleged secrecy and the threat of exposure to their political 
advantage.102 Legislatures enact open government laws for political 
gain, whether as part of interparty or interbranch competition.103 
Political parties and officials tend to embrace open government laws 
when out of power (although they resist enforcement or downplay the 
laws’ importance once in office).104 Thus even the most seemingly 
neutral good-government laws develop in a partisan context and 
require political support for their enactment. At the same time, 
presumptively non-partisan, apolitical civil society groups—including 
the press and non-governmental organizations—engage in political 
campaigns on transparency’s behalf by promoting and lobbying on 
 
 100. See Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345 (2019). Some question 
whether transparency should play any significant role in government administration. See FRANCIS 
FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY 506-08 (2014). 
 101. See generally Michener, Gauging the Impact, supra note 93, at 139 (calling for scholars and 
funders to concede that, and to develop methodological approaches for evaluation that can better capture 
transparency’s marginal impacts). 
 102. See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 22 (noting Trump’s criticism of Hillary Clinton during 
2016 campaign); FENSTER, supra note 22, at 6–7 (noting Obama’s criticism of his predecessor’s secrecy 
practices during 2008 campaign). 
 103. See Daniel Berliner, The Political Origins of Transparency, 76 J. POL. 479 (2014); Gregory 
Michener, How Cabinet Size and Legislative Control Shape the Strength of Transparency Laws , 
28 GOVERNANCE 77 (2015); Sabina Schnell, Cheap talk or incredible commitment? (Mis)calculating 
Transparency and Anticorruption, 31 GOVERNANCE 415 (2017). 
 104. See FENSTER, supra note 22, at 72–73. The same political dynamic has played a role in the 
enactment and amendment of administrative laws more generally. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce 
Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 
1557 (1996); McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 180 (1999). 
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behalf of open government laws.105  
Within this political context, open government laws come draped in 
powerfully symbolic language that make the laws appear to transcend 
politics. These laws proclaim their importance in titles that promise a 
tangible, visible state which is directly answerable to its public.106 
Proponents declare the laws will provide “sunshine” or sunlight to an 
otherwise darkened bureaucracy,107 “free” government information 
from official clutches,108 and grant the public a “right to know” the 
government and its actions.109 To make the case for transparency, 
advocates regularly invoke Louis Brandeis’s famous dictum about 
sunlight’s power as a disinfectant.110 In the words of the Sunlight 
 
 105. Histories of open government legislation and its implementation highlight the political nature 
of transparency laws. See, e.g., SAM LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS: THE PARADOX OF PRESS 
FREEDOM IN THE AMERICA 164-89 (2016) (focusing on the U.S.), SCHUDSON, supra note 70, at 4 (same); 
SHARMA, supra note 72 (India); WORTHY, supra note 72 (U.K.); Fabrizio Di Mascio et al., The Political 
Origins of Transparency Reform: Insights from the Italian Case, ITALIAN POL. SCI. REV. (forthcoming, 
published online 2018), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/italian-political-science-review-rivista-
italiana-di-scienza-politica/article/political-origins-of-transparency-reform-insights-from-the-italian-
case/06B8491B3F62EAAEBD47DA97169293D4. For descriptions of the role that NGOs have played, 
see generally Daniel Berliner, Transnational Advocacy and Domestic Law: International NGOs and the 
Design of Freedom of Information Laws, 11 REV. INT. ORGAN. 121 (2016); Mark Fenster, The 
Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their Alternatives in the Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 443, 451–66 (2012); Milton Mueller et al., Civil Society and the Shaping of Communication–
Information Policy: Four Decades of Advocacy, 20 INFO. SOC’Y 169 (2004). 
 106. On the recurring use of “sunshine” and “freedom” as metaphors in open government law and 
the importance of such symbolism to transparency advocacy, see FENSTER, supra note 22, at 3-6. 
 107. See, e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 39 U.S.C.); Open Government—The “Sunshine” Law, OFF. 
ATT’Y GEN. ASHLEY MOODY, 
https://myfloridalegal.com/pages.nsf/Main/DC0B20B7DC22B7418525791B006A54E4 (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2019) (referring colloquially to Florida’s open government laws as “sunshine laws”); Louis D. 
Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10 (“Publicity is justly commended 
as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”). 
 108. See generally FENSTER, supra note 22, at 27–29 (on the origins of the term “freedom of 
information” among U.S. advocates); see, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018). 
 109. See generally FENSTER, supra note 21, at 28–30 (on the origins of the term “right to know” 
among U.S. transparency advocates); see, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to . . . seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers”); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001–50 (1994) (requiring firms and individuals to report to state and local 
governments the quantities of potentially hazardous chemicals that have been stored or released into the 
environment). 
 110. For examples of the many uses of Justice Brandeis’s metaphor, see Fenster, Seeing the State, 
supra note 76, at 626 n.28. On Justice Brandeis’s work, see Pozen, Drift, supra note 71, at 108–10. 
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Foundation, an influential Washington, D.C.-based NGO focused on 
transparency that closed in September 2020, “We believe that 
information is power, or, to put it more finely, disproportionate access 
to information is power. We are committed to improving public access 
to public information by making it available to the public, online.”111 
Calaware, an NGO focused on advocating open government in 
California, describes its mission as helping to enforce “people’s rights 
to find out what citizens need to know to be truly self-governing” and 
fighting “excessive official secrecy” and “intimidation or retaliation” 
against those who inquire about or report government actions.112 
Advocates deploy vivid political arguments about transparency in 
hopes of persuading others of transparency’s status as an essential 
democratic norm. 
C.  Transparency Against the State: Open Government as a Populist 
Norm  
The politics of transparency are rooted in populism’s understanding 
of state power. Advocates invoke populism’s dualist view of the state 
and public113 by promising individual and collective self-rule that 
would allow the people to act in a responsible and informed manner in 
order to check a secretive, possibly corrupt state whose officers 
constitute an elite and secretly act on others’ behalf to advance narrow 
interests.114 As an ideal, transparency springs not only from an 
affirmative embrace of deliberative democratic ideals, but also from a 
fear of concentrated power and of government venality, as well as from 
 
 111. Our Mission, SUNLIGHT FOUND., https://sunlightfoundation.com/about/ (last visited Aug. 29, 
2019). 
 112. Our Mission, CALIFORNIANS AWARE, https://www.calaware.org/about/our-mission/ (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2019).  
 113. See supra Part I-A. 
 114. See, e.g.,  Introduction to the Open Government Guide, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (last visited Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.rcfp.org/introduction-to-the-open-
government-guide/ (connecting transparency to participatory democracy); Memorandum for the 
Establishment of a Freedom of Information Advocates Network, FOIANET (Sept. 28, 2002), 
http://foiadvocates.net/wp-content/uploads/FOIANet_Memorandum_28_09_2002_EN.doc (declaring 
that transparency and the availability of information on issues of public interest are “fundamental pre-
conditions for public participation”). 
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the public distrust that results from secret power’s excesses.115  
In addition, transparency promises to create and mobilize a popular 
will, guaranteeing a more direct, authentic, and populist relationship 
between the public and those who would represent and lead it.116 Like 
a populist movement or leader, or in conjunction with one, 
transparency promises to remove the distance between the public 
(“we”) and the state by putting an informed public back in charge—a 
public that can truly know its leadership through the flow of 
information. The National Freedom of Information Coalition, a group 
of national and state-level NGOs that advocate for journalists and 
freedom of information laws, has declared that its mission is “to foster 
transparent state and local government, which in turn leads to 
increased civic engagement, self-governance, public-affairs 
journalism and civic information, and ultimately a better-informed and 
more trustful society and democracy.”117 This new “society and 
democracy”—with a more engaged public that is better capable of 
governing itself—will support a government that is more trustworthy 
and representative. The state’s visibility will make it known rather than 
secret, honest rather than corrupt, and authentic rather than deceitful. 
As Emmanuel Alloa has argued, transparency promises that “only 
where nothing is withheld can things be genuine and subjects true to 
themselves.”118 Like populism, transparency imagines creating a 
politics of close proximity, where the state communicates directly and 
fully with the public and furthers the public’s will.119 
And like populism, transparency appears to have no necessary 
affiliation with the political left or right. Its roots lay in the progressivism 
 
 115. See generally Pozen, Drift, supra note 71, at 116–22 (summarizing the arguments made on 
behalf of the various open government laws enacted from 1966–76). 
 116. See supra Part I-B. 
 117. NATIONAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COALITION, 2020 VISION: VISION, MISSION, 
STRATEGIES, GOALS, OBJECTIVES FOR 2020 AND BEYOND (Aug. 6, 2019), available at 
https://www.nfoic.org/sites/default/files/pages/2019-08/NFOIC%202020%20Vision%20-
%20ADOPTED%20080619.pdf. 
 118. Emmanuel Alloa, Transparency: A Magic Concept of Modernity, in TRANSPARENCY, SOCIETY 
AND SUBJECTIVITY 21, 32 (Emmanuel Alloa & Dieter Thomä eds., 2018); see also Oana Brindusa Albu 
& Mikkel Flyverbom, Organizational Transparency: Conceptualizations, Conditions, and Consequences, 
58 BUS. & SOC’Y 268, 276 (2019) (transparency allows the public to access “authentic reality that is 
considered to be pre-existing and independent of the representations produced in the name of 
transparency”). 
 119. See supra Part I-C. 
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of the early twentieth century, especially as that tradition developed in 
support of the midcentury expansion of the administrative state.120 The 
promises of transparency advocates have echoed earlier efforts to reform 
the modern state during the so-called Populist and Progressive eras that 
sought to expand popular control over the U.S. federal and sub-federal 
government.121 Over the past several decades, civil society watchdogs 
have continued to emphasize transparency as part of more longstanding 
“good-government battles” to protect and expand the public’s input into 
elections and government accountability.122 Nevertheless, as David Pozen 
has argued, transparency advocacy has not solely been the province of the 
progressive and populist left, having drifted recently in a more 
conservative and libertarian direction. Corporate interests have more 
widely used open government laws and congressional rules as part of their 
efforts to oppose legislatures and administrative agencies that would 
regulate them, and as lawmakers and administrators have replaced 
command and control regulatory programs with disclosure-based 
regulations.123 Pozen has critiqued transparency as a “relatively empty 
concept, normatively, in the absence of a stable political referent”124 
whose meaning and influence is altered by shifts in “culture, technology, 
demography, political organization, and so on [that] will invariably alter 
its social and semiotic significance.”125 Transparency’s vacuity, he 
argues, leaves the concept vulnerable to use by interests inimical to its 
progressive roots, and renders it suspect as a political tool on which 
progressives can confidently rely. 
But like populism, transparency does not become an empty concept or 
 
 120. On transparency’s direct and indirect relationship to progressivism, see Pozen, Drift, supra 
note 71, at 108–22; see generally Joanna Grisinger, The (Long) Administrative Century: Progressive 
Models of Governance, in THE PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY: POLITICAL REFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL 
GOVERNMENT, AND THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 360, 368, 374–75 (Stephen Skowronek et al. 
eds., 2016) (placing the APA and the open government statutes within the history of progressive 
governance). 
 121. On progressivism generally, see MORONE, supra note 31, at 5–9; ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE 
SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877–1920, at 164–85 (1967). 
 122. See Pozen, Drift, supra note 71, at 117–22. 
 123. Id. at 124–41. 
 124. Id. at 151 n.231; see also id. at 104 (characterizing transparency as a “protean concept that 
may be invoked in a wide range of settings for a wide range of ends”). 
 125. Id. at 106; see also id. at 104 n.9 (characterizing transparency’s political valence as resulting 
from “the interactions over time between various legal instantiations of transparency and various political 
actors seeking to access or control information”). 
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administrative norm simply because of its uptake and use by a variety of 
political movements. Transparency also rests on a theory of power and of 
the state. Indeed, since its beginnings in the Progressive Era,126 the 
reaction to the expansion of government secrecy which led the press to 
initiate its campaign for open government, and popular discontent 
following the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and President 
Nixon’s resignation,127 transparency has been defined in part by its roots 
in populist discontent with the state and with the state’s detached 
relationship to the public. A freer flow of information, along with a 
concrete right to challenge officials’ unwillingness to disclose, promises 
to restore the state to its position as an instrument of the public’s will, 
capable of accurately furthering the public’s interest. This view of state 
power is constitutive of transparency’s understanding of democratic 
governance and of disclosure’s consequences, even as it stands ready for 
appropriation by political movements of all types. Populism’s core claim 
about a secret power bloc serves as an important source for the 
charismatic authority that transparency can claim as an administrative 
norm. This Article discusses the important differences between 
transparency and populism in Part IV after identifying how their 
continuities have allowed contemporary populists like Donald Trump to 
claim—plausibly, to his supporters—that he governed transparently even 
when he was clearly less transparent than the technocratic rules and norms 
which implement the concept require. 
IV. TRANSPARENCY IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
Nearly midway through his term, President Trump tweeted a complaint 
about the long-delayed report from the Department of Justice’s Inspector 
General on FBI Director James Comey’s handling of the controversy 
surrounding Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server while she was 
Secretary of State during the Obama administration:128 “There are so 
 
 126. Id. at 106. 
 127. See Sudha Setty, The President’s Question Time: Power, Information, and the Executive 
Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 254 (2008). 
 128. A general report about the FBI’s performance was issued a week after the tweet. See OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW DIVISION 18-04, A 
REVIEW OF VARIOUS ACTIONS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE 2016 ELECTION (June 2018), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1071991/download. On the controversy surrounding Clinton’s emails, see 
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many horrible things to tell, the public has the right to know. 
Transparency!”129 This was neither the first nor final time he used 
“transparency” or “transparent” in a presidential tweet, and he began 
using both terms before the 2016 presidential campaign.130 During his 
time in office, President Trump often characterized himself as the “most 
transparent” president in history,131 going so far as to hold open in the 
interest of “transparency” a high-stakes meeting with congressional 
leaders over ending a shutdown of the federal government.132 When 
asked, Trump supporters tended to agree with his self-assessment.133  
 
Joshua Jacobson, Note, The Secretary's Emails: The Intersection of Transparency, Security, and 
Technology, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1441 (2016). 
 129. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 5, 2018, 6:38 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1003949263481696256. 
 130. As of late August 2020, Trump’s account had tweeted or re-tweeted the words “transparency” 
or “transparent” thirty-eight times (twenty-six times since his January 20, 2017, inauguration). See TRUMP 
TWITTER ARCHIVE, http://trumptwitterarchive.com/archive (last visited Aug. 26, 2020). He frequently 
used the terms as part of his campaign to question President Obama’s birthplace. See, e.g., Donald J. 
Trump, Donald Trump Responds, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/08/opinion/lweb08trump.html (criticizing President Obama for failing 
to produce a birth certificate); see generally Michael Barkun, President Trump and the “Fringe,” 29 
TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE  437, 438–39, 442 n.5 (2017). 
 131. See Louis Jacobson, Is Donald Trump the Most Transparent President Ever? NO, POLITIFACT 
(June 4, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2019/jun/04/donald-trump/trump-administration-
most-transparent-ever-no/ (“Time and again, President Donald Trump has asserted that his administration 
has achieved championship-level transparency.”). Trump publicly pronounced the claim at least three 
separate times in April and May 2019. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, U.S. President, Remarks Before Marine 
One Departure (May 24, 2019) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-44/); Doyle McManus, The Most Transparent 
President Ever (Not), L.A. TIMES (May 1, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-
trump-transparent-accountable-20190501-story.html; Andrew Restuccia, Trump's 'Most Transparent 
President' Claim Looks Cloudy, POLITICO (May 23, 2019, 6:45 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/23/trumps-transparency-1342875. 
 132. See Matt Lewis, Everybody’s Wrong: Donald Trump Won the Chuck-n-Nancy Meeting, and 
Here’s Why, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/everybodys-wrong-donald-
trump-won-the-chuck-n-nancy-meeting-and-heres-why; Transcript of the Heated Meeting Between 
Trump, Pelosi and Schumer, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/transcript-of-the-heated-exchange-between-trump-pelosi-and-
schumer-2018-12-11 (quoting Trump to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi characterizing the meeting, “It's 
called transparency.”).  
 133. Dave Taylor, Pulse of the Voters: ‘Transparency’ Appeals to GOP Fan Bendsza, TRIBUNE 
STAR (Dec. 25, 2018), https://www.tribstar.com/news/local_news/pulse-of-the-voters-transparency-
appeals-to-gop-fan-bendzsa/article_6f73f8de-6bc6-5955-996b-d9f27213b02a.html (quoting 
interviewee’s description of Trump as “the most transparent president ever”); Ian Schwartz, CNN Focus 
Group of Trump Voters: “Exactly What I Voted For”, REALCLEAR POLITICS (Feb. 13, 2018), 
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This Part evaluates President Trump’s and his supporters’ claims. The 
Trump administration did not make the federal bureaucracy more visible 
in a technical sense. No one should be surprised by this. In his private 
career, Trump frequently threatened reprisal and litigation against anyone 
who exposed his business practices,134 and his apparent distaste for the 
First Amendment rights of his critics135 as well as his penchant for 
controlling information about himself136 suggested that his administration 
would not be as compliant with the letter or spirit of open government 
laws as those that came before. The first section considers how well his 
administration fulfilled the public’s “right to know” and furthered 
government transparency in a traditional sense: by complying with legal 
mandates in disclosure and administrative laws, with congressional 
demands for information, and with the less-formal norms by which 
elected officials and candidates have released information. It finds that 
the administration largely, and in some respects completely, failed 
effectively to do so. The second section considers the alternative 
understanding that Trump and his supporters have given to the concept of 
transparency. Given his penchant for lying, Trump’s claim to have been 
a transparent president could simply be dismissed, as could the views of 
his supporters who seemed not to have noticed or cared about the lack of 
 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/02/13/cnn_focus_group_of_trump_voters_exactly_what_i
_voted_for.html (quoting a voter: “He’s very transparent. He’s open.”). 
 134. See Adam Davidson, Trump’s Business of Corruption, NEW YORKER (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/21/trumps-business-of-corruption; Zoe Tillman, Donald 
Trump Has Used A Secretive Justice System to Keep Lawsuits Against Him out of Court, BUZZFEED NEWS 
(Aug. 8, 2019, 8:36 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/donald-trump-lawsuits-
secret-arbitration.   
 135. RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Making an Enemy of the Press, 2017 U. ILL. L. 
REV. ONLINE: TRUMP 100 DAYS (Apr. 29. 2017), available at 
https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/making-an-enemy-of-the-press/; Neil Richards, 
Free Speech and the Twitter Presidency, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE: TRUMP 100 DAYS (Apr. 29. 2017), 
available at https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/free-speech-and-the-twitter-
presidency/; Sonja R. West, Presidential Attacks on the Press, 83 MO. L. REV. 915, 917–33 (2018). 
 136. See Josh Dawsey & Ashley Parker, ‘Everyone Signed One’: Trump Is Aggressive in His Use 
of Nondisclosure Agreements, Even in Government, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2018), 
https://beta.washingtonpost.com/politics/everyone-signed-one-trump-is-aggressive-in-his-use-of-
nondisclosure-agreements-even-in-government/2018/08/13/9d0315ba-9f15-11e8-93e3-
24d1703d2a7a_story.html;  Mark Fenster, Revealing Secrecy Tools, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 11, 
2019), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/revealing-secrecy-tools/; Orly Lobel, Trump’s Extreme NDAs, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/trumps-use-ndas-
unprecedented/583984/. 
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empirical support for Trump’s claims.137 But even if justified, dismissing 
Trump’s claim misses the particular idea of transparency that the claim 
embraces, one that was most clearly on display in the open-ended and 
seemingly improvisational “real” communication of his voice and 
perspective via social media and political rallies. 
A.  Compliance with Transparency-Related Laws and Norms 
1. Documentary Disclosure and Open Data 
The most prevalent way that transparency is understood and measured 
is through documentary disclosure, which U.S. federal law mandates in 
FOIA.138 The extent of any administration’s compliance with FOIA 
mandates is difficult to gauge, given the vast number of requests made of 
hundreds of administrative agencies across the federal government and 
the disparate response to legislative commands and executive control.139 
Nevertheless, the Trump administration did not fulfill its FOIA 
obligations as well as its predecessor.140 One analysis found that the 
Trump administration censored, withheld, or claimed it could not find 
 
 137. See In 928 Days, President Trump Has Made 12,019 False or Misleading Claims  ̧ WASH. 
POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-claims-database/ (last visited Aug. 29, 
2019) (finding that as of August 5, 2019, President Trump had made 12,019 false or misleading claims in 
less than three years). He falsely claimed to be the most transparent president in history at least thirteen 
times. See id. 
 138. See Pozen, Freedom, supra note 2, at 1105-06 (noting FOIA’s centrality as a global model for 
transparency). 
 139. See Lauren Harper, Nate Jones & Tom Blanton, Three out of Five Federal Agencies Flout New 
FOIA Law, NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE (Mar. 11, 2017), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news-foia-
audit/foia/2017-03-11/three-out-five-federal-agencies-flout-new-foia-law (finding that a majority of 
federal agencies failed to comply with requirements established in FOIA amendment); NATIONAL 
SECURITY ARCHIVE, SUNSHINE AND SHADOWS: THE CLEAR OBAMA MESSAGE FOR FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION MEETS MIXED RESULTS (Mar. 15, 2010), available at 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB308/2010FOIAAudit.pdf (finding disparate agency 
response to memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder announcing Obama Administration’s more 
requester-friendly approach to FOIA compliance). 
 140. See Courtney Buble, Transparency in the Trump Era, GOV. EXEC. (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/03/transparency-trump-era/163574/; Thomas C. Ellington, 
Transparency Under Trump: Policy and Prospects, 29 PUB. INTEG. 127 (2019);  How Transparent is 
President Trump? Audit Shows Three-Quarters of His Decisions Have Been Bad for Openness, NAT’L 
SECRUITY ARCHIVE (Mar. 12, 2020), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/foia-audit/foia/2020-03-13 (March 12, 
2020). 
28
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss2/2
314 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
   
 
requested records at a higher rate than the Obama administration.141 The 
number of lawsuits filed against the federal government for alleged non-
compliance steadily rose after Trump’s inauguration, especially against 
top executive branch agencies like the Department of Justice and the 
Department of Homeland Security, exceeding the number of suits filed 
against previous administrations.142 An increase in lawsuits challenging 
agencies’ failures to respond at all to requests accounts for most of this 
increase,143 as FOIA litigation contributes to lengthier legal disputes.144 
The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), which prominently 
pursued the Trump administration’s deregulatory agenda, proved 
especially resistant to FOIA requests.145 At the same time, the 
administration brazenly refused to comply with the record-retention 
 
 141. Associated Press, Federal Government Sets New Record for Censoring, Withholding Files 
Under FOIA, CBS NEWS (Mar. 12, 2018, 2:40 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/foia-federal-
government-sets-new-record-for-censoring-withholding-files-trump-administration/; see also Michael 
Morisy, Under Trump, a Strained FOIA Continues to Show Its Seams, MUCKROCK (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2018/jan/25/trump-foia-one-year-later/ (complaining about 
lack of FOIA compliance during first year of Trump Administration); The Limits of Transparency and 
FOIA Under Trump, FIRST AMENDMENT WATCH (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://firstamendmentwatch.org/limits-transparency-foia-trump/ (collecting links and stories 
complaining about Trump Administration noncompliance). 
 142. See Christine Mehta, Annual Report: FOIA Lawsuits Reach Record Highs in FY 2018, THE 
FOIA PROJECT (Nov. 12, 2018), http://foiaproject.org/2018/11/12/annual-report-foia-lawsuits-reach-
record-highs-in-fy-2018/ (finding that the rate of filing lawsuits had more than doubled during Fiscal 
Years 2017 and 2018 compared to the annual number of suits filed during the Obama Administration); 
see also FOIA Project Staff, October 2019 FOIA Litigation with Five-Year Monthly Trends, THE FOIA 
PROJECT (Nov. 19, 2019), http://foiaproject.org/2019/11/19/october-2019-foia-litigation-with-five-year-
monthly-trends/ (finding that FOIA lawsuit filings continued to show rise during Trump Administration). 
Filers included media organizations and nongovernmental organizations. See FOIA Project Staff, Media 
Lawsuits Seeking Government Records Jump Under Trump, THE FOIA PROJECT (Aug. 2, 2018), 
http://foiaproject.org/2018/08/02/media-foia-lawsuits-jump-under-trump/; FOIA Project Staff, FOIA 
Suits Filed by Nonprofit/Advocacy Groups Have Doubled Under Trump, THE FOIA PROJECT (Oct. 18, 
2018), http://foiaproject.org/2018/10/18/nonprofit-advocacy-groups-foia-suits-double-under-trump/. 
 143. See FOIA Project Staff, FOIA Lawsuits Are Taking Longer To Resolve, THE FOIA PROJECT 
(Jan. 23, 2020), http://foiaproject.org/2020/01/23/lawsuits-annual-2019/. 
 144. See FOIA Project Staff, FOIA Suits Rise Because Agencies Don’t Respond Even as Requesters 
Wait Longer to File Suit, THE FOIA PROJECT (Dec. 15, 2019), http://foiaproject.org/2019/12/15/foia-
suits-rise-because-agencies-dont-respond-even-as-requesters-wait-longer-to-file-suit/. 
 145. See Brie D. Sherwin, The Upside Down: A New Reality for Science at the EPA and Its Impact 
on Environmental Justice, 27 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 57, 98–99 (2019); Emily Holden, Anti-Secrecy Lawsuits 
Soaring Against Pruitt’s EPA, POLITICO (Feb. 26, 2018, 5:01 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/26/pruitt-epa-secrecy-lawsuits-environment-355842; Bryan 
Koenig, Can Courts Handle the Increased FOIA Strain Under Trump?, LAW360 (Feb. 16, 2018, 8:06 
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1013602. 
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requirements of the Presidential Records Act (“PRA”):146 Trump tore up 
paper documents,147 avoided whenever possible having notes written 
before and after meetings with foreign leaders,148 White House officials 
communicated with private, encrypted message applications rather than 
their official government email accounts,149 and the administration put 
political appointees rather than civil servants in charge of PRA 
compliance.150 
The Trump administration also retreated from its predecessor’s open 
data initiative, in which federal agencies release to the public 
“government information that can be universally and readily accessed, 
used, and redistributed free of charge in digital and machine-readable 
form.”151 The initiative’s purpose was to enable the public to access 
information on agency performance and to allow private entities to make 
use of and profit from data the government collects.152 Beginning soon 
 
 146. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201 et seq. (2018). 
 147. See Annie Karnie, Meet the Guys Who Tape Trump's Papers Back Together, POLITICO (June 
10, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/10/trump-papers-filing-system-635164. 
 148. See Greg Miller, Trump Has Concealed Details of His Face-to-Face Encounters with Putin 
from Senior Officials in Administration, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-has-concealed-details-of-his-face-to-
face-encounters-with-putin-from-senior-officials-in-administration/2019/01/12/65f6686c-1434-11e9-
b6ad-9cfd62dbb0a8_story.html; Annie Karnie, Meet the Guys Who Tape Trump's Papers Back Together, 
POLITICO (June 10, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/10/trump-papers-filing-system-
635164. 
 149. See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 924 F.3d 602, 609 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019) (holding that the Presidential Records Act does not authorize issue of writ of mandamus to 
challenge White House officials’ use of encrypted message app that automatically deleted messages once 
read in order to avoid creating records); Kel McClanahan, Trump and the Demise of the Presidential 
Records Honor System, JUST SECURITY BLOG (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/63348/trump-and-the-demise-of-the-presidential-records-honor-system/. 
 150. See Alexi McCammond, Scoop: Cyber memo warns of new risks to White House network, 
AXIOS (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.axios.com/exclusive-white-house-cyber-memo-warns-of-new-
network-risks-9aa19c6c-77a3-485b-919b-1dd9bd691514.html; Marcy Wheeler, White House Putting 
Political Employees in Charge of Presidential Records Act Compliance, EMPTYWHEEL (Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://www.emptywheel.net/2019/10/23/white-house-putting-political-employees-in-charge-of-
presidential-records-act-compliance/. 
 151. Beth Simone Noveck, Open Data: The Future of Transparency in the Age of Big Data, in 
TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 206, 208 (David 
E. Pozen & Michael Schudson eds., 2018); see also Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies: Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) 
(issued immediately following Obama’s inauguration and committing to release on a public website 
“high-value data sets” in an “open format”). 
 152. See Cass R. Sunstein, Output Transparency vs. Input Transparency, in TROUBLING 
TRANSPARENCY, supra note 150, at 187, 190–92. 
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after Trump’s inauguration, the administration removed, manipulated, 
and censored data that had been available on agency websites and the 
data.gov portal that the Obama administration initiated.153 By reducing 
the quantity and availability of this data, as well as efforts to develop 
innovative programs and policies,154 the Trump administration did not 
meet the standard of transparency set by the previous administration. 
Although significant, the Trump administration’s departure appeared 
incremental rather than radical or disruptive.155 The Obama 
administration may have met its FOIA obligations more effectively than 
its successor, but transparency advocates frequently complained about its 
failure to respond to FOIA requests from journalists and public interest 
organizations,156 and argued that it had prioritized the release of open data 
 
 153. See Nathan Cortez, Information Mischief Under the Trump Administration, 94 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 315, 324–35 (2019); see generally Web Integrity Project, SUNLIGHT FOUND., 
https://sunlightfoundation.com/web-integrity-project/ (last visited July 10, 2019) (publicizing efforts to 
“monitor changes to government websites, holding our government accountable by revealing shifts in 
public information and access to Web resources, as well as changes in stated policies and priorities”). 
 154. For example, the Trump administration’s National Action Plan for Open Government, which 
was delayed prior to release, merely compiled and listed existing open data programs rather than 
announced new ones, as had previous reports. See Jessie Bur, New open government plan doubles down 
on old priorities, FED. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://www.federaltimes.com/management/2019/02/25/new-open-government-plan-doubles-down-on-
old-priorities/; Tajha Chappellet-Lanier, U.S. finally submits fourth National Action Plan for Open 
Government, FEDSCOOP (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.fedscoop.com/national-action-plan-open-
government-2019/. 
 155. See generally Koenig, supra note 144 (describing increase in FOIA requests and litigation 
since Trump’s inauguration, noting that his administration had been less responsive and open than its 
predecessor, but not characterizing Trump Administration as uniquely or radically disruptive). 
 156. Transparency advocates were disappointed in the failure of Obama’s administration to live up 
to the President’s stated commitment to transparency. See, e.g., Jameel Jaffer, Government Secrecy in the 
Age of Information Overload, SHORENSTEIN CENTER ON MEDIA, POL. & PUB. POL’Y (Nov. 6, 2017, 10:40 
AM), https://shorensteincenter.org/jameel-jaffer-salant-lecture-2017/; Daniel J. Metcalfe, From FOIA 
Service to Lip Service: The Unexpected Story of White House Visitor Logs, 36 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 
3, 3 (Spring 2011) (expressing disappointment at Obama Administration’s resistance to releasing White 
House visitor logs); John Wonderlich, Obama's DOJ Seeks to Weaken the FOIA, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Oct. 
28, 2011, 5:36 PM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2011/10/28/obamas-doj-seeks-to-weaken-the-foia/. 
Scholars shared advocates’ disappointment. See Derek E. Bambauer, Chutzpah, 6 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. 
& POL'Y 549, 561 (2013); Heidi Kitrosser, “Trust Me” and Transparency Do Not Mix, 2017 U. ILL. L. 
REV. ONLINE: TRUMP 100 DAYS (Apr. 29, 2017), available at 
https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/trust-me-and-transparency-do-not-mix/; Ronald 
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transparency, Accountability, and Competency: An Essay on the Obama 
Administration, Google Government, and the Difficulties of Securing Effective Governance, 65 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 449, 467 (2011); Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government 
in the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 90 (2012). 
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over responding to FOIA record requests.157 While the increase in recent 
legal challenges under FOIA to Trump administration agencies’ 
disclosure denials likely suggests agencies’ willingness to delay and 
oppose disclosure, it may also have reflected ideological opposition on 
the part of private litigants158 to the administration’s efforts to remove 
federal regulations imposed under the previous administration.159 The 
Trump administration’s higher degree of non-compliance and the 
increased levels of litigation it faced were not so high as to reflect a 
universal, coordinated effort to flout FOIA and were not inconsistent with 
the tendency among Republican administrations to take a less disclosure-
friendly approach to FOIA than Democratic ones.160  
 
 157. See Cary Coglianese, The Transparency President? The Obama Administration and Open 
Government, 22 GOVERNANCE 529, 534–35, 539–41 (2009); J.B. Wogan, Obama's transparency record: 
lots of data, not as much sunlight, POLITIFACT (July 16, 2012), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2012/jul/16/obama-report-card-transparency-sunlight/. Key members of the Obama 
administration considered the open data initiative to be more significant for open government than FOIA 
compliance. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 151, at 188 (former director of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs under Obama arguing that the “output transparency” released under the open data 
initiative has a stronger justification than the “input transparency” established by FOIA); Beth Simone 
Noveck, Is Open Data the Death of FOIA?, YALE L.J. FORUM 273, 274 (Nov. 21, 2016), 
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/NoveckFinal_xjaur4gj.pdf (former United States deputy chief 
technology officer for open government who led Obama Administration’s Open Government Initiative 
arguing that “open data’s more systematic and collaborative approach represents a radical and welcome 
departure from FOIA because open data concentrates on information as a means to solve problems to the 
end of improving government effectiveness”). 
 158. See Ethan Barton, Liberal Activists Are Bombarding Trump with New FOIA Lawsuits, DAILY 
CALLER (May 31, 2017, 9:08 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2017/05/31/liberal-activists-are-bombarding-
trump-with-new-foia-lawsuits. 
 159. KEITH H. BELTON & JOHN D. GRAHAM, AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FOUND. CENTER. FOR 
POL’Y RES., TRUMP’S DEREGULATORY RECORD: AN ASSESSMENT AT THE TWO-YEAR MARK 5 (Mar. 
2019), available at http://accf.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ACCF-Report_Trump-Deregulatory-
Record-FINAL.pdf; (characterizing Trump’s campaign for office as promising “widespread deregulation 
of the US economy” and concluding that after two years he had “followed through with an aggressive 
program of deregulation”); William W. Buzbee, The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency 
in Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1358, 1376 (2018) (“As of mid-2018, policy change orders, 
directives, proposals, or actions have overwhelmingly been in a deregulatory direction.”). 
 160. Compare, e.g., Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to Heads of All Federal 
Departments and Agencies on the Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/oip/011012.htm (George W. Bush Administration Attorney General 
advising that, “When you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to withhold records, in whole or 
in part, you can be assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a 
sound legal basis”), with Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., to Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2009), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2009/06/24/foia-memo-march2009.pdf (Obama 
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2.  Administrative Procedures 
In their efforts to remove or reduce existing regulatory mandates while 
creating new mandates relating to immigration, the Trump administration 
often circumvented the legally-required processes that, at least in theory, 
make agencies’ quasi-legislative, administrative rulemaking transparent 
to the public—one of the key rationales for the Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”).161 During Trump’s term, courts often reversed many of 
these agencies’ efforts.162 One academic otherwise sympathetic to at least 
some of the administration’s substantive deregulatory goals characterized 
the Trump EPA’s record as “poor” and “unenviable,” and the product of 
a staff that lacked “experienced policy hands with the knowledge and 
expertise to navigate the administrative process.”163 Less sympathetic 
scholars characterized the administration’s process (or lack thereof) as 
“regulatory slop”—reflecting purposeful disregard for well-established 
requirements to engage with the public in the rulemaking process, 
insufficient care about whether their efforts are procedurally permissible, 
and a generalized failure to execute laws faithfully to statutes and the 
Constitution.164  
 
Administration Attorney General withdrawing Ashcroft memorandum and announcing “a clear 
presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails”). 
 161. See generally RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 429 
(7th ed. 2015) (characterizing administrative rulemaking as “the most visible mode of agency 
policymaking”); Martin Shapiro, A Golden Anniversary? The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, 19 
REG. 40, 42–43 (1996) (describing “transparency and participation” as purposes at the APA’s core).  
 162. According to one organization that tracked relevant litigation, when challenged, the Trump 
Administration’s major deregulatory efforts had been reversed or withdrawn at a rate of more than 85% 
as of August 2020. See Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, 
(Aug. 24, 2020),   https://policyintegrity.org/deregulation-roundup; see also Keith B. Belton & John D. 
Graham, Trump's Deregulation Record: Is It Working?, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 850-59 (2019) (finding 
that that Trump's deregulatory agenda was blocked or delayed by federal courts due to flaws in rulemaking 
process). Typically, agencies win the majority of such challenges. See Margot Sanger-Katz, For Trump 
Administration, It Has Been Hard to Follow the Rules on Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/upshot/for-trump-administration-it-has-been-hard-to-follow-the-
rules-on-rules.html?login=email&auth=login-email. 
 163. See Jonathan Adler, Hostile Environment, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 27, 2018, 10:33 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/10/15/hostile-environment/; see also James P Pfiffner, 
The Contemporary Presidency: Organizing the Trump Presidency, 48 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 153, 153 
(2018) (describing the dysfunction and absence of regular policy development process in Trump 
Administration). 
 164. Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop and 
Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651, 1655 (2019); Peter M. Shane, Faithful Nonexecution, 29 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 405, 465-66 (2019) see also Lisa Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Problems 
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The Trump administration repeated a particular pattern of disregard for 
administrative process several times. It attempted to establish a so-called 
“Muslim Ban,” for example, with a rushed Executive Order from the 
White House165 following numerous presidential pronouncements 
suggesting religious animus as its motivation.166 After the administration 
reissued different iterations of the “ban” in response to serial lower court 
reversals,167 the Supreme Court finally upheld the third version of the 
order on the grounds that the relevant statutory authority “exudes 
deference”168 and the executive action fell squarely within a sphere that 
the Constitution delegated to presidential action.169 The Court’s majority 
did not consider the troubling process and public pronouncements upon 
which the President and his administration relied,170 granting deference 
that the four dissenting justices, in two separate opinions, would not have 
given due to the manner in which the ban was put into place.171 More 
 
(So Far) of Trump's Deregulatory Binge, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 15 (2018) (excoriating Trump 
administration agencies for displaying “autocracy, impulsivity, and jerry-rigged reasoning”). 
 165. See Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8978–79 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
 166. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2017), reconsideration en banc 
denied, 853 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2017), reconsideration en banc denied, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017), 
cert. denied sub nom. Golden v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 448 (2017) (noting presidential statements 
characterizing his intent to impose a Muslim ban); State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1148 n.9 (D. 
Haw. 2017), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 923 
(2018), rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (noting presidential tweets characterizing his intent 
to impose a Muslim ban). 
 167. See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 756 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), vacated by Trump v. 
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (mem.) (explaining that the President's actions "must be scrutinized with 
caution" because they were "incompatible" with the processes and mandates set out by Congress in 
statutes (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring)); Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir.  2018), cert. granted, 
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018) (noting public statements from the 
President and administration figures that would allow “an objective observer [to] conclude that the 
primary purpose of the Proclamation [was] to exclude Muslims from the United States”).  
 168. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018) (holding that the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), “exudes deference to the President in every clause”). 
 169. Id. at 2409. 
 170. Id. at 2418, 2423. 
 171. See id. at 2437–38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the entire context of the Executive 
Order’s issuance and development should be considered in evaluating its validity); Id. at 2433 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Sotomayor regarding the existing record of bias). In his separate 
concurrence, Justice Kennedy expressed disquiet about statements made by government officials during 
the process of issuing the third Executive Order. See id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that 
officials, in their unreviewable statements and actions, should take care not to disregard the Constitution); 
see also William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 155, 170 (2019) (noting lower 
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recently, the Court held that the Department of Commerce failed to 
employ “[r]easoned decisionmaking” under the APA to explain its 
inclusion of a question about citizenship in the 2020 Census.172 Multiple 
agencies repeatedly sought to deny the statutory authority that prior 
administrations claimed in promulgating regulatory rules without meeting 
the substantive and procedural requirements in both the APA and 
enabling acts.173 Agencies also splintered the steps involved in rolling 
back regulations in order to avoid the APA’s requirements to engage in a 
new notice and comment rulemaking.174 And the EPA lost a number of 
lawsuits as it sought to stay, delay, and ultimately revoke regulations 
promulgated by the Obama administration—deregulatory efforts that 
were frustrated or deferred because of the agency’s failure to follow 
required procedures.175 
3.  Congressional Investigations 
After reclaiming a majority in the 2018 midterm elections, Democrats 
in the House of Representatives began to use their control over House 
committees to initiate multiple investigations of President Trump and 
Executive Branch agencies and officers. Committees issued subpoenas 
when the administration and current and former personnel resisted 
demands for documents and testimony.176 The disputes that created the 
 
courts’ willingness to probe the government's motivations to some appreciable degree on the basis of 
Trump’s public statements). 
 172. Dep't of Commerce v. NewYork, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019). 
 173. See William W. Buzbee, Agency Statutory Abnegation in the Deregulatory Playbook, 68 DUKE 
L.J. 1509, 1591 (2019). 
 174. See William W. Buzbee, Deregulatory Splintering, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 439, 442 (2019). 
 175. See William W. Buzbee, The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency in 
Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1358, 1378 (2018); Heinzerling, supra note 163, at 14; Bethany 
Davis Noll & Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (noting Trump 
Administration’s poor record in attempting to suspend enforcement prior to repealing or promulgating a 
new rule). The administration’s tendency to skirt statutory obligations, if not ignore them altogether, was 
not limited just to APA rulemaking compliance. See, e.g., El Paso Cnty. v. Trump, 408 F. Supp. 3d 655, 
856-57(W.D. Tex. 2019) (finding that the President’s proclamation of a national emergency that required 
funding support for a U.S.-Mexico border wall was in violation of the 2019 Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, Pub. L. No. 116–6 (2019) (to be printed at 133 Stat. 13)). 
 176. See generally Kerry W. Kircher, Trump’s Unprecedented Fight to Withhold Information, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/house-needs-its-
subpoena-power-against-trump/596857/ (listing instances of administration resistance to congressional 
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most conflict included the President’s resistance to submit financial 
information and tax returns,177 and the White House’s refusal to allow 
current and former officials to testify before House committees.178  
Such conflicts between a President and Congress are longstanding and 
occurred during the Obama administration as well.179 Congress has long 
been forced to rely upon its inherent subpoena power to obtain 
information from a recalcitrant White House and presidential 
administration,180 and it is difficult, if not impossible, to compare the 
extent of the Trump administration’s defiance of congressional demands 
for information to that of its immediate predecessors.181 Trump, however, 
portrayed this interbranch dispute in absolute terms, declaring to reporters 
on the White House lawn that, “We’re fighting all the subpoenas,”182 
while his White House counsel declared to House leaders that the 
President would not participate in the “constitutionally illegitimate” 2019 
 
efforts to obtain information and characterizing such resistance as the equivalent of “declar[ing] war on 
the House’s investigation of the executive branch”). 
 177. See Andrew Desiderio, Trump Sues to Block House Subpoena of Financial Records, POLITICO 
(Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/22/trump-sues-oversight-committee-chairman-
finance-records-1284995 (House Oversight and Reform Committee subpoena of Trump’s accounting 
firm); Maggie Haberman, William K. Rashbaum & David Enrich, Trump Sues Deutsche Bank and Capital 
One to Block Compliance With Subpoenas, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/us/politics/trump-lawsuit-deutsche-bank.html (suit to block 
financial institutions’ compliance with House Intelligence and Financial Services Committees subpoena 
for financial records). 
 178. See David A. Graham, Don McGahn’s Testimony Would Be the Main Event, ATLANTIC (May 
20, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/white-house-blocks-mcgahn-testifying-
congress/589873/. 
 179. See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(denying Obama administration Attorney General’s motion to dismiss subpoena from Republican-led 
congressional committee in “Fast and Furious” scandal). 
 180. On the long history of Congress’s power to investigate, see Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 
S. Ct. 2019, 2029-31 (2020); Raoul Berger, Congressional Subpoenas to Executive Officials, 75 COLUM. 
L. REV. 865 (1975); James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of 
Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1926). 
 181. Compare, e.g., Kircher, supra note 175 (asserting that the Trump administration resisted 
congressional oversight to an “unprecedented degree”) with Michael W. McConnell, The Way Trump Is 
Asserting the Rights of His Office Is Not Impeachable, WASH. POST (May 1, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/05/01/trump-resists-congressional-subpoenas-thats-
what-presidents-do/ (characterizing Trump administration’s response to congressional investigation as 
“unremarkable” and akin to those of his recent predecessors). 
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impeachment inquiry.183 Courts have increasingly served as the sole 
means to resolve such disputes in recent decades, weakening Congress’s 
power to obtain information from the Executive184 without a clear 
exercise of legislative will.185 Facing the Trump administration’s 
expansive view of its constitutional privilege to withhold information and 
its dismissal of congressional authority, House Democrats moved forward 
with impeachment rather than face the delays attendant to high-stakes 
constitutional litigation.186 The Trump administration’s defiance of a 
Democratic House majority187 was neither unique nor remarkable, but it 
appeared exceptionally public and absolute— part of an unequivocal 
resistance to information disclosure to any adverse congressional 
investigation of the President and White House. 
4.  Informal Disclosure Norms 
President Trump’s reluctance to disclose information about his 
previous and ongoing business concerns further distinguished him from 
his predecessors.188 Constitutional structure and some common law 
 
 183. See Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, White House Counsel, to the Honorable Nancy Pelosi et al. 
(Oct. 8, 2019), at 8, available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6459905-White-House-
Letter-to-Pelosi-Impeachment.html; see also Frank O. Bowman III, White House Letter Distorts Both Law 
and History on Impeachment, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/66534/white-
house-letter-distorts-both-law-and-history-on-impeachment/ (Cippollone letter’s legal arguments “are 
without foundation.”); Keith E. Whittington, Must the House Vote to Authorize an Impeachment Inquiry?, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/must-house-vote-authorize-impeachment-
inquiry (rejecting Cippollone letter’s legal arguments). 
 184. See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 181-89 (2017). 
 185. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to Information: Using Will and Leverage, 52 DUKE 
L.J. 323 (2002). 
 186. See Charlie Savage, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit by Ex-Trump Aide Subpoenaed in Impeachment 
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/us/kupperman-lawsuit-
dismissed.html. 
 187. This dispute is ongoing as of this writing. See Trump v. Mazars USA, L.L.P., 140 S. Ct. 2019, 
2035-36 (holding that Congressional subpoenas of presidential information can be enforced, but 
remanding to lower courts the application of a four-part test to balance the competing congressional and 
executive branch interests); cf. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431 (2020) (rejecting presidential 
claims for absolute immunity from subpoenas in a state criminal proceeding and remanding to lower 
courts for consideration of other challenges). 
 188. See Jonathan Adler, All the President’s Papers, 2020 CATO SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(Draft at 1) (“No President has so thoroughly resisted transparency and disentanglement with potential 
conflicts of interest.”). 
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doctrines—most notably executive privilege—shield the presidency from 
the formal openness and ethical requirements that apply more broadly to 
the executive branch.189 The same is true of certain statutory and 
regulatory disclosure requirements, including exemptions from federal 
conflict of interest rules that prohibit officials from participating in 
government matters where they have a financial interest.190 But the 
President is required to make certain limited disclosures on an annual 
basis about his financial and ownership interests.191 Former presidents 
and presidential candidates have typically disclosed a fuller picture of 
their private holdings than the law requires to comply with informal 
expectations and norms.192 Commonly understood as “unwritten or 
informal rules of political behavior,”193 “shared codes of conduct that 
become common knowledge within a particular community,”194 or 
conventions that suggest what one should do while describing what is 
generally done,195 norms have long shaped and constrained presidential 
behavior, even as they have evolved over time. Less directly related to 
transparency than formal administrative law, such norms concern the 
public-facing nature of the presidential office. 
Consistent with his willingness to challenge a full range of norms that 
cover presidential behavior and statements,196 President Trump refused to 
 
 189. On constitutional structure and information access, see Adam M. Samaha, Government 
Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 932–56 
(2006); on the executive privilege doctrine, see Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive 
Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 491 (2007); on the “state secrets” doctrine, see generally Robert 
M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 
(2007). 
 190. 18 U.S.C. § 202(c) (2018). 
 191. 5 U.S.C. app. § 101(d), (f)(1) (2018). 
 192. See infra note 197-207 and accompanying text. 
 193. Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2189 (2018). 
 194. STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 101 (2018). 
 195. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 2–5 (Max 
Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954). 
 196. President Trump may not have begun the current erosion of prevailing political norms, a 
process that Congress seems to have initiated, see David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of 
Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 9 (2014), but his presidency suggested that norms no longer apply. See Neil S. 
Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177, 192–
98 (2018); Renan, supra note 192, at 2214; W. Bradley Wendel, Law and Nonlegal Norms in Government 
Lawyers' Ethics: Discretion Meets Legitimacy, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1995, 2007–08 (2019); Josh Chafetz 
& David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1430, 1451 (2018); Emily 
Bazelon, How Do We Contend with Trump’s Defiance of Norms?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/magazine/how-do-we-contend-with-trumps-defiance-of-
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disclose information about the relationship between his administration 
and his notoriously complex personal finances and family business 
enterprises.197 A president’s resistance to financial disclosures is difficult 
to subject to judicial review and congressional investigation,198 and 
concerns a subject that Trump considered privileged well before he 
entered politics.199 Most famously, he departed from longstanding 
precedent among presidents and presidential candidates by resisting calls 
to release his tax returns.200 The annual financial disclosure forms he filed 
with the Office of Government Ethics provided only a bare outline of his 
income and complex business holdings.201 He fought a congressional 
 
norms.html?partner=bloomberg (“Trump’s flouting of norms was the siren song of his candidacy, and it 
has become a defining feature of his presidency.”). For a sustained account of the norm-based presidency, 
including President Trump’s breach of those norms, see Renan, supra note 192. 
 197. See, e.g., Michael A. Memoli, Trump's Financial Disclosure Form: It's Complicated, L.A. 
TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essential-washington-
updates-trump-releases-financial-disclosure-1497653636-htmlstory.html (reporting on the release of 
President Trump’s financial disclosure form, which listed “565 separate roles that Trump holds in his vast 
business empire, largely LLCs and corporations established to manage his hotels, apartments and golf 
courses”); Ryan Lizza, How Trump Broke the Office of Government Ethics, THE NEW YORKER (July 14, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/ryan-lizza/how-trump-broke-the-office-of-government-ethics 
(explaining how Trump departed from ethical norms regarding conflicts of financial interest and  
disclosure of personal holdings); David A. Fahrenthold & Jonathan O'Connell, Nine Questions About 
President Trump's Businesses and Possible Conflicts of Interest, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2018), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/nine-questions-about-president-trumps-businesses-and-
possible-conflicts-of-interest/2018/01/29/f8b2a3a8-014f-11e8-9d31-d72cf78dbeee_story.html 
(attempting, based on publicly available information, to answer questions about Trump’s businesses, the 
revocable trust he created upon taking office, and the extent of his indebtedness). 
 198. Challenges to the President’s ongoing business interests under the Emoluments Clause failed. 
See, e.g., In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 379 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue 
under Emoluments Clause). Efforts to secure his tax returns through congressional investigations and state 
legislation did not bear fruit during his presidency. See Jeff Stein et al., ‘It’s Going to Be Tough’: House 
Democrats Appear Less Likely to Get Trump’s Tax Returns Before 2020 Election, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 
2019), https://beta.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/08/22/its-going-be-tough-house-democrats-appear-
less-likely-get-trumps-tax-returns-before-election/. 
 199. See DAVID CAY JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF DONALD TRUMP 77–83, 147–53 (2016) 
(describing Trump’s longstanding effort to obfuscate and keep secrets about his net worth and his public 
image). 
 200. See Siegel, supra note 195, at 201–02; Daniel Hemel, Can New York Publish President 
Trump’s State Tax Returns?, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 62, 63 (2017); see generally George K. Yin, 
Congressional Authority to Obtain and Release Tax Returns, 154 TAX NOTES 1013 (2017); Jill Disis, 
Presidential Tax Returns: It Started with Nixon. Will It End with Trump?, CNN (Jan. 26, 2017, 2:06 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2017/01/23/news/economy/donald-trump-tax-returns/index.html. 
 201. See Anna Massoglia & Karl Evers-Hillstrom, World of Influence: A Guide to Trump’s Foreign 
Business Interests, OPENSECRETS.ORG (June 4, 2019), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/06/trump-foreign-business-interests/ (noting that “Annual 
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committee’s subpoena of his accounting firm to review his financial 
records,202 while his Treasury Secretary refused to comply with a 
congressional subpoena to release his tax returns.203  
Trump also declined either to establish a blind trust to hold his 
investments or to limit his investments to assets like diversified mutual 
funds over which he would have no control.204 Blind trusts and mutual 
funds would protect against corruption from within the White House by 
either forcing the public disclosure of a President’s assets or shielding the 
information from the President and those who would seek his favor or do 
his bidding. Instead, Trump placed his assets into a revocable trust 
managed by two of his children and a longtime business associate, of 
which he is the sole beneficiary and over which he appears to retain 
significant authority.205 He pledged that any profits from foreign 
governments would be donated to the United States Treasury, but that 
promise was unenforceable and its fulfillment was impossible to review 
without full disclosure of his business and financial interests.206 This hints 
 
disclosure forms only require assets held at the end of the reporting period to be disclosed and require 
only minimal documentation of transactions. Income and property values are also often listed in wide 
ranges so the total amount may, in actuality, be much higher or lower.”); see also Decca Muldowney et 
al., A Guide for Digging Through Trump’s Financial Disclosures, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2018, 5:00 
AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/a-guide-for-digging-through-trumps-financial-disclosures 
(attempting to piece together Trump’s finances and business interests from his financial disclosure form).  
 202. See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, No. 19-5142, 2019 WL 5089748 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2019) 
(upholding congressional authority to issue a subpoena to investigate the President’s finances). 
 203. Alan Rappeport & Nicholas Fandos, Steven Mnuchin Refuses to Comply with Subpoena for 
Trump’s Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/us/politics/mnuchin-trump-tax-returns-subpoena.html. 
 204. Walter M. Shaub, Jr., Dir., Office of Gov’t Ethics, Remarks at the Brookings Institution(Jan. 
11, 2017), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/20170111_oge_shaub_remarks.pdf/. 
 205. See Derek Kravitz & Al Shaw, Trump Lawyer Confirms President Can Pull Money from His 
Businesses Whenever He Wants, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 4, 2017, 5:53 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-pull-money-his-businesses-whenever-he-wants-without-
telling-us; Steve Reilly et al., Did Trump Keep His 19 Promises to Insulate Himself from His Business? 
Only He Knows, USA TODAY (Mar. 18, 2019, 9:08 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/in-
depth/news/politics/2019/03/18/president-donald-trumps-promises-didnt-end-business-
entanglements/3030377002/; Massoglia & Evers-Hillstrom, supra note 200. 
 206. See Bernard Condon, Trump Org Donates Nearly $200k to Cover Foreign Profits, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 25, 2019),  https://www.apnews.com/a4349ac80a7048bdb61f017fffd9623f; 
David A. Fahrenthold & Jonathan O’Connell, Trump Organization Says It Has Donated Foreign Profits 
to U.S. Treasury, but Declines to Share Details, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-organization-says-it-has-donated-foreign-profits-to-us-
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not simply at opacity, but at corruption. As two Trump critics have 
written, “In ways large and small, he has put the power of the presidency 
to work for his friends, his family, and himself.”207 
Despite the efforts of President Trump and his administration, 
information about his administration and finances leaked. The press 
vigorously covered the administration, relying on documentary leaks and 
anonymous sources208—coverage and leaks that Trump frequently 
assailed, dismissed, and occasionally sought to prevent.209 Transparency 
laws and norms, however, demand more of an administration than leaks 
to the press, and the Trump administration was neither transparent in an 




 207. BENJAMIN WITTES & SUSAN HENNESSEY, UNMAKING THE PRESIDENCY: DONALD TRUMP'S 
WAR ON THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL OFFICE 138 (2020). 
 208. Leaks out of the Trump White House regularly occurred. See Steven Aftergood, Leaks of 
Classified Info Surge Under Trump, SECRECY NEWS BLOG (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2019/04/leaks-surge/; Ken Dilanian, Under Trump, More Leaks — and More 
Leak Investigations, NBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-
department/under-trump-more-leaks-more-leak-investigations-n992121; Jordan Fabian, Leaks continue 
to plague Trump White House despite crackdown, THE HILL (June 9, 2018, 6:17 A.M.), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/391430-leaks-plague-trump-white-house-with-no-end-in-
sight. Financial information too became public. See Jonathan Swan, Mary Trump book: How she leaked 
Trump financials to NYT, AXIOS (July 7, 2020), https://www.axios.com/mary-trump-book-donald-trump-
financials-c1635cb1-d1b0-48e0-b816-72d270170796.html.  Indeed, the Trump administration leaked not 
simply despite its failed efforts to hold information, see, e.g., Mark Fenster, Revealing Secrecy Tools, 
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 11, 2019), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/revealing-secrecy-tools/ 
(discussing Trump’s use of non-disclosure agreements and noting their limitations and failures during his 
presidency), but as part of its everyday operations. See Daniel Froomkin, Press Watch: Donald Trump 
says not to trust anonymous sources — for once, he's not lying, SALON (Dec. 7, 2019), 
https://www.salon.com/2019/12/07/press-watch-donald-trump-says-not-to-trust-anonymous-sources-for-
once-hes-not-lying/ (distinguishing between leaks and the ubiquity of “spin” from individuals within the 
Trump administration, who speak anonymously to the press for their own purposes); Margaret Sullivan, 
Trump’s tough talk on leaks is one thing. His actions tell another tale, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/dont-use-my-name-but-heres-a-scoop-trump-loves-
leaks-some-of-them/2017/02/28/dcab5338-fd06-11e6-8ebe-6e0dbe4f2bca_story.html (describing the 
administration’s propensity to leak strategically).  
 209. On the Trump administration’s efforts to clamp down on leaks, see Katie Benner, Pentagon 
Analyst Is Charged in Leaks of Classified Reports, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/us/politics/kyle-frese-classified-leaks.html; Mike Allen, Trump’s 
Risky Leak War, AXIOS (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.axios.com/trumps-risky-leak-war-1513304673-
da66b4fb-35a5-46dc-9cd5-d134d1dbabd4.html. On the omnipresence and complexity of leaking from the 
executive branch, see David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and 
Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013). 
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some constraints upon his administration,210 but its transparency record 
ranged from troubling—in terms of the administration’s legal 
compliance—to poor in its dealings with Congress and its flouting of 
ethical norms regarding the opaque and uniquely tangled web of Trump’s 
wealth.211  
B.  President Trump’s Populist Transparency 
This section presumes that Donald Trump campaigned as a right-wing 
populist and continued to present himself as such after the 2020 
election—a presumption that seems to be the general consensus among 
experts in the study of populism and conservatism.212 For purposes of this 
Article, the fact that he did not govern as a traditional populist, especially 
on economic and regulatory policy,213 is less important than his reliance 
on a populist style in his self-presentation, communication with his 
followers, and understanding of transparency. 
 
 210. See supra Part III.A.ii. 
 211. The record of his administration’s senior cabinet members and high-level administrators and 
advisors was little better. Many of them resigned after revelations about their activities both while in office 
and prior to entering the administration. See Paul Waldman, New Revelations Show the Trump 
Administration Is Making the Swamp Even Swampier, WASH. POST (June 10, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/10/new-revelations-show-trump-administration-is-
making-swamp-even-swampier/; David Leonhardt & Ian Prasad Philbrick, Trump’s Corruption: The 
Definitive List, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/opinion/trump-
administration-corruption-conflicts.html. The turnover rate at the top levels of the Trump Administration 
through mid-2019 was far higher than those of all of his predecessors. See Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, Tracking 
Turnover in the Trump Administration, BROOKINGS (August 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-turnover-in-the-trump-administration/ (showing that the 
Trump Administration’s turnover rate of senior advisers was as high in his third year in office as his 
predecessors’ full-term records). 
 212. See JUDIS, supra note 6, at 66–74; COREY ROBIN, THE REACTIONARY MIND: CONSERVATISM 
FROM EDMUND BURKE TO DONALD TRUMP 242–44 (2d ed. 2017); Uri Friedman, What Is a Populist? And 
Is Donald Trump One?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/what-is-populist-trump/516525/; Oliver & 
Rahn, supra note 53, at 202. 
 213. See William E. Scheuerman, Donald Trump meets Carl Schmitt, 45 PHIL. & SOC. CRIT.  1170, 
1176-78 (2019); Matthew Yglesias, The Trump-Era Threat to Democracy Is the Opposite of Populism, 
VOX (Dec. 10, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/10/18126132/trump-
populism-democracy-threat-minority-rule. 
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1.  Transparency, Live: Trump Rallies 
Trump’s rally speeches, delivered in his highly performative, 
spontaneous style before thousands of attendees and often simulcast by 
television networks and cable news channels, served as his signature form 
of direct address to his base. He continued using the basic format of his 
campaign rallies immediately after the election, and he held more such 
political events than any recent sitting president, including forty-six in 
2018 in the lead-up to that year’s midterm elections, twenty-one in 2019, 
and ten in early-2020, prior to the COIVD-19 pandemic.214 The rallies did 
not focus on policy in any traditional sense, and he did not use them 
primarily to announce new initiatives or the nomination or departure of a 
member of his administration.215 By rarely unveiling or divulging 
information that his followers and the broader public do not already know, 
they did not at all resemble the disclosure of records, data, or information 
that have come to constitute transparency as a legal concept. Instead, the 
rallies served as a means to extend his campaign and reach his base in a 
live, telecast performance that focused political and popular attention on 
Trump and his presidency.  
The pre-pandemic rally speeches’ content resumed the narrative he 
began upon announcing his campaign. They replayed, for the pleasure of 
Trump supporters and to the anger and dismay of those who opposed him, 
what was already known: that he based his presidency on a nationalism 
 
 214. See List of Post-Election Donald Trump Rallies, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_post-election_Donald_Trump_rallies (last visited Aug. 27, 2020). 
By mid-October 2018, Axios reported, President Trump had held thirty-three “#MAGA campaign rallies” 
compared to President Obama’s nine political rallies and one rally for what became known as Obamacare. 
See Mike Allen, Trump vs. Obama: The Midterm Rallies Edition, AXIOS (Oct. 14, 2018), 
https://www.axios.com/2018-midterm-elections-donald-trump-barack-obama-rallies-e83bf5af-9fc2-
444a-b56a-d974b20df3da.html; see also Jill Colvin, Trump Has Held More than 2 Dozen Rallies as He 
Kicks into High Gear Ahead of the High-Stakes Midterms, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 14, 2018, 11:36 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-rallies-increase-ahead-of-midterms-2018-10; Dave Levinthal, 
Donald Trump Created a Permanent Presidential Campaign. Here’s How, CENTER. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY 
(Feb. 18, 2019), https://publicintegrity.org/federal-politics/donald-trump-president-campaign-money-
fundraising/. On Trump’s embrace of his rallies and endless campaign, see Charles Homans, The Post-
Campaign Campaign of Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/magazine/donald-trump-rallies-campaigning-president.html; 
Gabby Orr, Advisers Urge Trump to Defer 2020 Rallies, POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2019, 5:02 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/08/trump-2020-rallies-1211799.   
 215. He did, however, make policy announcements on Twitter just prior to rallies. See, e.g., Aaron 
Rupar, Trump Blindsides ICE with Mass Deportation Announcement on Eve of Reelection Rally , VOX 
(June 18, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/6/18/18683600/trump-mass-deportation-tweet-ice. 
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that drew moral and racial boundaries around the groups to which his 
supporters presumptively belong in order to exclude others whom he cast 
as representing social and political threats to his vision of the nation.216 
His post-election speeches adapted his campaign narrative in light of his 
victory, the story of which he regularly retold as a combination of 
stupendous upset and inevitability. America regained its status due to the 
unprecedented and unsurpassed successes President Trump had achieved: 
economic growth, as evidenced by the number of jobs created and rising 
stock indexes; widespread deregulation; tax cuts he signed into law; and 
the imminent completion of “The Wall” at the U.S.-Mexico border and 
the forthcoming replacement of “Obamacare” with a far superior health 
finance system, neither of which occurred during his presidency.217 His 
speeches were most specific in the insults he directed at the enemies that 
stood in his way. These included opposition Democrats, the “fake news,” 
“Crooked Hillary,” and the special counsel investigation’s “Witch Hunt” 
and the “Russia Hoax” that caused the special counsel’s appointment. 
Both within and across performances, his speeches rambled and repeated 
little that would enlighten or educate the public about his administration, 
and often misstated or blatantly lied about easily confirmable facts.218  
But the speeches’ content was secondary to their form and context. 
 
 216. See JENNIFER SCLAFANI, TALKING DONALD TRUMP: A SOCIOLINGUISTIC STUDY OF STYLE, 
METADISCOURSE, AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 81 (2018); Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Doron Taussig, 
Disruption, Demonization, Deliverance, and Norm Destruction: The Rhetorical Signature of Donald J. 
Trump, 132 POL. SCI. Q. 619, 619 (2017); Michèle Lamont, Bo Yun Park & Elena Ayala-Hurtado, 
Trump’s Electoral Speeches and His Appeal to the American White Working Class, 68 BRIT. J. SOC. S153, 
S173 (2017); Alexandra Homolar & Ronny Scholz, The Power of Trump-Speak: Populist Crisis 
Narratives and Ontological Security, 32 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 344, 347–51 (2019). 
 217. A database of Trump speeches appears at Donald Trump Speech Transcripts, FACTBASE, 
https://factba.se/transcripts/speeches (last visited July 30, 2019). Various sources publish speech 
transcripts. See, e.g., Abbey Doyle, ICYMI: Here’s a Transcript of President Trump’s Speech at the 
Evansville Rally, COURIER & PRESS (Sept. 4, 2016, 11:06 AM), 
https://www.courierpress.com/story/news/local/2018/09/04/heres-transcript-president-trumps-speech-
evansville-rally/1191281002/; Times Staff Writer, Here’s a Full Transcript of President Trump’s Speech 
from His Tampa Rally, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-
politics/buzz/2018/08/01/heres-a-full-transcript-of-president-trumps-speech-from-his-tampa-rally. 
 218. See Salvador Rizzo, Anatomy of a Trump rally: 67 percent of claims are false or lacking 
evidence, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/07/anatomy-
trump-rally-percent-claims-are-false-or-lacking-evidence. For a more comprehensive effort to track 
President Trump’s false claims, see Trump Claims Database, WASH. POST, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-claims-database (last visited July 31, 2019) 
(tracking thousands of his false and misleading claims). 
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They were raucous spectacles akin to a rock concert219 and served as a 
communal, sometimes even joyful experience for those in attendance,220 
allowing them to solidify and proclaim their position as Trump 
supporters.221 Attendees laughed at Trump’s jokes and familiar talking 
points, and they participated by chanting phrases that demonized his 
enemies. Crowds became as much an element of the televised events as 
Trump’s own speech—even, at times, engaging in physical altercations 
against anti-Trump protestors and the press.222 Although they already 
knew in advance how Trump’s speech would proceed, either from 
attending previous ones or watching them on television, audience 
members claimed to feel renewed by his repertoire and mix of repetition 
 
 219. Commentators most frequently analogized Trump rallies to Grateful Dead shows. See, e.g., 
Noah Bierman, Anatomy of a Trump Rally: The Hero (That’s Him), a Jester (Also Him), Villains, Damsels, 
Dystopia and Lots of Grievances, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-rally-anatomy-20181010-story.html; Katie Rogers, 
The Trump Rally: A Play in Three Acts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/12/us/politics/trump-maga-rally-play.html; Tamara Keith 
and Amy Walter on Trump campaign kickoff, Democratic debates, PBS NEWS HOUR (June 17, 2019), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/tamara-keith-and-amy-walter-on-trump-campaign-kickoff-
democratic-debates. Given the audience’s demographic and likely aversion to hallucinogens, Jimmy 
Buffett concerts seem more analogous. 
 220. Ryan Lizza, The Unexpected Joy at a Trump Rally in Iowa, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.politico.com/amp/news/2020/01/31/unexpected-joy-trump-rally-iowa-109864. 
 221. See Sam Altman, I’m a Silicon Valley Liberal, and I Traveled Across the Country to Interview 
100 Trump Supporters—Here’s What I Learned, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 23, 2017, 11:34 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/sam-altman-interview-trump-supporters-2017-2 
[https://perma.cc/PDL9-N4XV]; Bierman, supra note 219; Dave Osborn, Trump Supporters Line Up 
early for Front-Row Seat to Tuesday's Rally in Orlando, NAPLES DAILY NEWS (June 18, 2019, 11:37 
AM), https://www.naplesnews.com/story/news/politics/2019/06/17/donald-trump-rally-orlando-
supporters-arrive-early-front-row-seat/1476155001/. 
 222. Jamelle Bouie, The Joy of Hatred, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/opinion/trump-rally.html;  Kathleen Hunter, “Send Her Back” Is 
Trump’s New “Lock Her Up”: Campaign Update, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 18, 2019, 2:28 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-18/-send-her-back-is-trump-s-new-lock-her-up-
campaign-update; Ayal Feinberg et al., Counties that Hosted a 2016 Trump Rally Saw a 226 Percent 
Increase in Hate Crimes, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/trumps-rhetoric-does-inspire-more-hate-
crimes/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9096859b2711#click=https://t.co/bYXsN60xzH; Bodyslams, Bombs 
and Shoves: Anti-media Violence in Trump's America, AXIOS (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.axios.com/violence-against-media-bombs-shootings-trump-a59584cb-ac2c-4813-bfef-
7b3a4233690d.html; William Saletan, Trump Is Celebrating Violence and Nationalism at His Rallies, 
SLATE (Oct. 23, 2018, 6:41 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/trump-nationalist-gop-
violence.html; see also Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 605 (6th Cir. 2018) (dismissing, on First 
Amendment grounds, plaintiff’s claim that Trump statements at campaign rally had incited crowd to beat 
protestors). 
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and structured improvisation as well as by their own collective 
response.223 Some traveled long distances to attend rallies, arriving hours 
before scheduled start times to mingle and stand in line for seats while 
wearing or purchasing branded merchandise to announce their loyalty.224 
The rallies reached their tragic apotheosis on January 6, 2021, with the 
“Stop the Steal” rally at the Ellipse to protest Congress’s certification of 
the electoral college vote, which inspired his supporters to march to the 
Capitol and a mob of them to invade it.  
The rallies’ performative, repetitive, nearly ritualistic qualities may not 
have revealed the state and its actions in any formal legal sense, but they 
served as a key form of communication from Trump to his supporters. 
They displayed his emotions and personal beliefs as they demonstrated 
his willingness to speak his mind (and his followers’ feelings) even at the 
risk of giving offense. His followers viewed his willingness to speak 
bluntly, humorously, and offensively as a form of truth-telling.225 As 
president, Trump seemed “authentic”—a term his supporters used to refer 
to his unrehearsed, plain-spoken, and ultimately transparent rhetoric and 
style of address. 226 Indeed, the performative nature of his speeches and 
 
 223. Ed Pilkington, Feel the Love, Feel the Hate – My Week in the Cauldron of Trump's Wild 
Rallies, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/01/trump-rallies-
america-midterms-white-house; Rogers, supra note 219; Matthew Stolle, Trump's Vanguard Sees Rallies 
as a Lovefest,  POST-BULLETIN (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.postbulletin.com/news/local/trump-s-
vanguard-sees-rallies-as-a-lovefest/article_50649644-c75a-11e8-a0d0-f773c3159bfe.html. 
 224. Altman, supra note 221; Rogers, supra note 219; Jeremy Diamond & Jeff Zeleny, Trump 
Rallies: Campaign-funded, for a Reason, CNN (Mar. 26, 2017, 2:43 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/15/politics/donald-trump-campaign-rallies/index.html; Sally Persons, 
Trump Campaign Sees Potential for New 2020 Supporters, in Rally Turnout, FOX NEWS (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-campaign-sees-potential-for-new-2020-supporters-in-rally-
turnout. 
 225. Matthew J. Dickinson, Explaining Trump’s Support: What We Saw and Heard at His 
Campaign Rallies, 16 FORUM: J. APPLIED RES. CONTEMP. POL. 171, 178 (2018); Jamieson & Taussig, 
supra note 216, at 621–22; Lamont et al., supra note 216, at S165; Robin Tolmach Lakoff, The Hollow 
Man: Donald Trump, Populism, and Post-Truth Politics, 16 J. LANGUAGE & POL. 595, 604 (2017). 
 226. See Nancy Cook, Trump’s Race Playbook: Excoriate the Left and Enthrall His Base, POLITICO 
(July 29, 2019, 5:58 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/29/trump-race-2020-1440436; 
Dickinson, supra note 225, at 178; Dahlia Lithwick, In 2020, Voters Should Abandon Their Obsession 
with “Authenticity,” SLATE (Feb. 13, 2019, 6:20 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/2020-
candidates-authenticity-trump-democratic-field.html; John Zogby, Clinton, Trump and the Battle for 
Authenticity, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2016, 9:36 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnzogby/2016/09/24/clinton-trump-and-the-battle-for-
authenticity/#3a50e2664de1. During the 2016 presidential campaign, commentators frequently contrasted 
Trump’s seeming surplus of “authenticity” with Hillary Clinton’s alleged lack of it. See Shawn Parry-
Giles & David Kaufer, Why Do So Many Believe Hillary Clinton Is Inauthentic?, THE CONVERSATION 
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their knowing untruth paradoxically appeared to establish that he hid 
nothing and that he was more accessible and public than previous 
presidents.227 His diction relied on simple, informal, and short nouns and 
action verbs that he repeated frequently, enabling his speeches to seem 
comprehensible and direct.228 His hand and body gestures, often mocking 
and comical in ways that more careful and studied politicians avoid, 
further accentuated his bond with his followers (who understood his jokes 
and found them funny) and his differences from those whom he 
mocked.229  
Given regularly in a mass, live setting among devoted followers, and 
then broadcast live semi-regularly on Fox News,230 Trump’s speeches 
offered a collective experience that felt authentic—even to those who 
opposed him, who viewed his speeches as accurately reflecting his beliefs 
and prejudices. In his rallies, Trump stood and spoke as a singular leader 
in front of thousands, claiming to represent millions of like-minded 
citizens and to reveal their shared concerns and identity. 
 
(Oct. 30, 2016, 10:09 PM), https://theconversation.com/why-do-so-many-believe-hillary-clinton-is-
inauthentic-67302. 
 227. See Oliver Hahl, Minjae Kim & Ezra W. Zuckerman Sivan, The Authentic Appeal of the Lying 
Demagogue: Proclaiming the Deeper Truth about Political Illegitimacy, 83 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 25–26 
(2018). 
 228. See Jacques Savoy, Trump’s and Clinton’s Style and Rhetoric During the 2016 Presidential 
Election, 25 J. QUANTITATIVE LINGUISTICS 168, 168 (2017); Orly Kayam, The Readability and Simplicity 
of Donald Trump’s Language, 16 POL. STUD. REV. 73, 81–86 (2018); Yaqin Wang & Haitao Liu, Is Trump 
Always Rambling Like a Fourth-Grade Student? An Analysis of Stylistic Features of Donald Trump’s 
Political Discourse During the 2016 Election, 29 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 299, 299 (2018); Sara Ahmadian, 
Sara Azarshahi & Delroy L. Paulhus, Explaining Donald Trump via Communication Style: Grandiosity, 
Informality, and Dynamism, 107 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 49, 52 (2017); Marta 
Degani, Endangered Intellect: A Case Study of Clinton vs Trump Campaign Discourse , 8 IPERSTORIA 
131, 133–34 (2016); Homolar & Scholz, supra note 216, at 348. Trump thus represented a broader trend 
in presidential rhetoric towards conversational, anti-intellectual discourse. See generally ELVIN T. LIM, 
THE ANTI-INTELLECTUAL PRESIDENCY: THE DECLINE OF PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC FROM GEORGE 
WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH (2018). 
 229. Kira Hall, Donna M. Goldstein & Matthew Bruce Ingram, The Hands of Donald Trump: 
Entertainment, Gesture, Spectacle, 6 HAU: J. ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY 71, 74–75 (2016). 
 230. On how television networks’ decisions about whether to telecast Trump rallies evolved, see 
Todd Shields & Emma Kinery, Trump Can't Rely on Cable News Running His Rallies In Full Anymore, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-11/trump-
rallies-no-longer-assured-airtime-as-tv-networks-reassess. 
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2.  Transparency in 240 Characters: @realDonaldTrump  
President Trump’s Twitter account pursued a similar mode of address 
as his speeches. He created the @realDonaldTrump account in 2009 to 
spread his opinion and extend his brand,231 and he credits Twitter with 
helping him secure the 2016 election by giving him a platform “to bypass 
. . . unfair media coverage and speak directly to voters.”232 In a stipulation 
as part of litigation over whether the Constitution allowed him to block 
users from his Twitter account, President Trump stated that since his 
inauguration in 2016 and with the assistance of White House Social 
Media Director Daniel Scavino, he used the @realDonaldTrump account 
“to announce, describe, and defend his policies; to promote his 
Administration’s legislative agenda; to announce official decisions; to 
engage with foreign political leaders; to publicize state visits; [and] to 
challenge media organizations whose coverage of his Administration he 
believes to be unfair.”233 His first press secretary declared that tweets from 
the @realDonaldTrump account should be considered “official 
statements by the President of the United States,”234 and his tweets were 
often posted from both his personal account and the official presidential 
account (@POTUS) within minutes of each other.235 
Despite their official nature and his Twitter account’s status as a public 
forum,236 President Trump’s tweets appeared spontaneous, unfiltered, 
 
 231. Douglas B. McKechnie, From Secret White House Recordings to @realdonaldtrump: The 
Democratic Value of Presidential Tweets, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 611, 632 (2018); Anthony J. Gaughan, 
Trump, Twitter, and the Russians: The Growing Adolescence of Federal Campaign Finance Law, 27 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 79, 97–98 (2017).  
 232. Chris Baynes, Donald Trump Says He Would Not Be President Without Twitter, INDEPENDENT 
(Oct. 22, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-
trump-tweets-twitter-social-media-facebook-instagram-fox-business-network-would-not-be-
a8013491.html; Shontavia J. Johnson, Donald Trump, Disruptive Technologies, and Twitter’s Role in the 
2016 American Presidential Election, 27 WIDENER COMMONWEALTH L. REV. 39, 77, 79 (2018). 
 233. Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 234. Id. Notably, the government stipulated in Knight First Amendment that the President’s tweets 
are “official records” that must be preserved under the Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2202. Id. at 
232. 
 235. McKechnie, supra note 231, at 632. In terms of overall activity, the President appeared to favor 
using his own @realDonaldTrump account for the majority of his Twitter activity. The 
@realDonaldTrump handle posted over 34,000 tweets, while the @POTUS account posted about 4,000. 
See Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump; Donald Trump 
(@POTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/potus.   
 236. Knight First Amendment Inst., 928 F.3d at 237. 
48
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss2/2
334 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
   
 
honest, and, above all, authentically Trumpian—the product of whatever 
was on his mind at the moment of its sending.237 They revealed his 
thoughts, they invoked his supporters as “Americans” and “the people” 
(and called out his opponents as neither), and they very occasionally 
announced administration policy as well as political appointments and 
resignations.238 They were “punchy,” timely, and ephemeral—and 
thereby newsworthy and attention-grabbing.239 Their misspellings, 
typographical errors, and dramatic use of all-caps further accentuated the 
account’s authenticity, distinguishing his voice from that of the polished, 
professional campaigners who allow their accounts to be managed by paid 
professionals.240 They also made his account appear similar to those of 
his base of supporters.241 Indeed, his tweets both previewing and during 
the “Stop the Steal” rally that preceded the Capitol riot and insurrection 
 
 237. See generally BRIAN L. OTT & GREG DICKINSON, THE TWITTER PRESIDENCY: DONALD J. 
TRUMP AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE RAGE 59 (2019) (noting the “homology,” or structural similarity, 
between Trump’s “natural style of speaking and Twitter’s underlying logic”); Galen Stolee & Steve Caton, 
Twitter, Trump, and the Base: A Shift to a New Form of Presidential Talk? , 6 SIGNS & SOC’Y 147, 161 
(2018) (noting how the tweets’ form and syntax confirm Trump’s “‘authenticity’ to his supporters”); see 
also Gunn Enli, Twitter as Arena for the Authentic Outsider: Exploring the Social Media Campaigns of 
Trump and Clinton in the 2016 US Presidential Election, 32 EUR. J. COMM. 50, 50 (2017) (noting use of 
“authenticity markers,” tweets that “expressed impoliteness and political incorrectness, often using capital 
letters,” marking Trump as an “authentic outsider”); Ramona Kreis, The “Tweet” Politics of Donald 
Trump, J. LANG. & POL. 607, 615 (2017) (characterizing Trump’s Twitter account as employing “an 
‘authentic style’ which corroborates his constructed position of an outsider and legitimate representative 
of the people distancing himself from the establishment”); Paromita Pain & Gina Masullo Chen, The 
President Is In: Public Opinion and the Presidential Use of Twitter, SOC. MEDIA & SOC’Y,  Apr.–June 
2019, at 9, available at https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305119855143 (“He uses a colloquial, conversational 
style of language that seems to illustrate his attempts to be authentic and unfiltered, which underscores 
his populist message.”). 
 238. According to an online archive of his tweets, the Twitter accounts he most frequently 
mentioned were his own and those of his family and Fox News and its hosts; as of August 1, 2019, his 
presidential tweets have invoked “Fake News” (362 times), Russia and “collusion” (452 times), and 
“Clinton” (212 times). During the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump’s account was far less likely to take 
a position on a particular issue than Clinton’s account, but much more likely to attract attention in the 
news media. See Heather K. Evans, Kayla J. Brown & Tiffany Wimberly, “Delete Your Account”: The 
2016 Presidential Race on Twitter, 36 SOC. SCI. COMP. REV. 500, 503–07 (2017). 
 239. Stolee & Caton, supra note 237, at 161–63. 
 240. Enli, supra note 237, at 59. 
 241. See generally Thomas Gallagher, The Outsider on the Inside: Donald Trump’s Twitter Activity 
and the Rhetoric of Separation from Washington Culture, 27 ATLANTIC J. COMM. 183 (2019) (noting 
prevalence of Trump’s presidential tweets that present him as independent of party and government); see 
also Stolee & Caton, supra note 237, at 164; Pain & Chen, supra note 237, at 9; Andrea McDonnell & 
Mark Wheeler, @realDonaldTrump: Political Celebrity, Authenticity, and Para-social Engagement on 
Twitter, 10 CELEBRITY STUD. 427 (2019). 
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were read by many of his followers as direct invitations to disrupt the 
peaceful transfer of power—and ultimately led Twitter to ban him from 
its platform.242 By relying more heavily on Twitter than on press releases 
and formal and official statements, Trump’s campaign and presidency 
intimated that his sentiments exclusively constituted the direction of the 
White House, executive branch, and nation.243 
C. Conclusion 
 The Trump administration did not make the federal bureaucracy more 
visible in a technical sense (although he shrunk parts of it, most notably 
the State Department244 and National Security Council245), and his 
administration’s compliance with administrative laws including FOIA 
were marginally worse than that of his immediate predecessor.246 He 
explicitly refused to follow presidential norms regarding information 
disclosure about his personal finances—types of documents over which 
courts and Congress failed to exercise clear authority247 and to which 
 
 242.  Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Jan. 8, 2021), 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html. 
 243.  Corina Lacatus, Populism and the 2016 American Election: Evidence from Official Press 
Releases and Twitter, 52 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 223, 226 (2019). 
 244. See Jack Corrigan & Government Executive, The Hollowing Out of the State Department 
Continues, ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/tillerson-trump-state-foreign-service/553034/ 
(identifying drop in State Department’s civilian workforce); Robbie Gramer & Colum Lynch, Despite 
Pompeo’s Call for ‘Swagger,’ Trump Slashes Diplomatic Budget, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/11/trump-federal-budget-steep-cuts-to-state-department-foreign-aid-
development-diplomacy-pompeo/ (noting “steep cuts to the State Department and U.S. Agency for 
International Development” in Trump Administration’s proposed 2020 budget); Erich Wagner, These 
Agencies Have Lost the Most Workers Under Trump, GOV. EXEC. (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.govexec.com/management/2018/08/these-agencies-have-lost-most-workers-under-
trump/150577/ (twelve of fifteen Cabinet-level agencies have shrunk in size under President Trump). 
 245. See Jennifer Jacobs & Justin Sink, Trump Orders Cut to National Security Staff After Whistle-
Blower, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-05/trump-
orders-cut-to-national-security-staff-after-whistle-blower. 
 246. On challenges under the Emoluments Clause and efforts to require release of his tax forms, 
see supra note 198. 
 247. Challenges to the President’s ongoing business interests under the Emoluments Clause failed. 
See, e.g., In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 379 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue 
under Emoluments Clause). Efforts to secure his tax returns through congressional investigations and state 
legislation did not bear fruit during his presidency. See Jeff Stein, Rachael Bade & Jacqueline Aleman, 
‘It’s Going to Be Tough’: House Democrats Appear Less Likely to Get Trump’s Tax Returns Before 2020 
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Trump held fast as a private citizen.248 Transparency advocates and 
corruption foes like Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics justifiably 
claimed that President Trump had done “exactly the opposite” of draining 
the swamp, leading public venality “into uncharted territory, innovating 
forms of corruption.”249 
But President Trump and his Twitter account were the “real” Donald 
Trump, at least to his followers.250 The public could know and understand 
his administration simply by paying attention to him rather than to the 
documents and statements issued by the White House and his surrogates. 
What you saw in his direct public address was what you got: he spoke for 
his followers, pronouncing their truth bravely, humorously, and 
offensively. He appeared transparent. And those in the press and among 
his political opposition who challenged him and his presentation of the 
truth surely must lie and keep secrets of their own. They were 
simultaneously at least as bad as Trump and unable to pass authoritative 
judgment on him.251 His mode of communication—lacking in specifics, 
full of hyperbole and often downright lies—thus constituted a 
transparency that deemphasized the technocratic in favor of the personal, 
populist, and, ultimately, political.  
V.  TRANSPARENCY BETWEEN POPULIST POLITICS AND TECHNOCRATIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
Donald Trump’s claims of  transparency are one part of the broader 
populist style that he exemplified as president. Like other nationalist, 
right-wing populists who have won recent elections, Trump claimed to 
uphold transparency as one among numerous of the “general signifiers” 
 
Election, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2019), https://beta.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/08/22/its-going-
be-tough-house-democrats-appear-less-likely-get-trumps-tax-returns-before-election/. 
 248. See DAVID CAY JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF DONALD TRUMP 77–83, 147–53 (2016) 
(describing Trump’s longstanding effort to obfuscate and keep secrets about his net worth and his public 
image). 
 249. That is his Twitter handle. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrum), TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump (last visited Nov. 2, 2020). 
 250. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, Trump’s 2,000 Conflicts of Interest (and 
Counting), https://www.citizensforethics.org/2000-trump-conflicts-of-interest-counting/ (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2019). 
 251. See Clare Birchall, Interrupting Transparency, in TRANSPARENCY, SOCIETY, AND 
SUBJECTIVITY, supra note 117 , at 343, 359-60. 
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of democracy.252 Like other populists, he used (and is likely to continue 
to use) new communications platforms to speak directly to his followers 
and to present them with at least a veneer of an authentic voice.253 As the 
political theorist Nadia Urbinati has argued: 
A populist government relies on, but also reinforces and amplifies, a 
strongly opinionated audience that clamors for the direct translation of its 
opinions into decisions. This audience becomes intolerant of dissent and 
disparaging of pluralism; and, in addition it claims full transparency, a 
“virtue” that is supposed to expunge the “hypocrisy” of pragmatic 
politics.254 
This is a different understanding of transparency than the one that the 
Freedom of Information movement has developed. Deeply partisan and 
political, Trump’s transparency was subject not only to his agenda and 
whims, but also to his false statements and outright lies. 
Trump frustrated his opponents with his failure to meet transparency’s 
technocratic rules and normative expectations that at least in theory are 
subject to the neutral rule of law and to widely-held and generally-
applicable norms. But his supporters not only found those rules and 
expectations irrelevant, they may have even enjoyed the degree to which 
his administration frustrated laws enforced by his opponents and the 
bureaucratic “deep state” and that were utilized by the mainstream press 
to criticize him.255 This is clear hypocrisy. Trump and his supporters 
 
 252. Giuseppe Zaccaria, The People and Populism, 31 RATIO JURIS. 33, 42 (2018). Trump was like 
other contemporary populists in this regard, even if he governed somewhat differently. Compare, for 
example, Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte, who shares Trump’s communicative style but who 
governs more violently, see Nicole Curato, Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte and 
the New Terms of Philippine Populism, 47 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 142 (2017); and Hungary’s Victor Orbán, 
who shares Trump’s tendency to warn of secret conspiracies that threaten the people and his party’s rule 
but who governs more paternalistically (and corruptly), see Zsolt Enyedi, Paternalist populism and 
illiberal elitism in Central Europe, 21 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 9 (2016). 
 253. See MOFFITT, supra note 42, at 91–92 (noting the relationship between contemporary 
populism and social media); see generally ANGELA NAGLE, KILL ALL NORMIES: ONLINE CULTURE WARS 
FROM 4CHAN AND TUMBLR TO TRUMP AND THE ALT-RIGHT (2017) (chronicling the rise of the online alt-
right and its relationship to the 2016 election and Trump’s racial and gender politics).  
 254. URBINATI, supra note 21, at 16. On the role of the relationship among transparency, trust, and 
a public’s personal connection to leadership, see Portia Roelofs, Transparency and Mistrust: Who or What 
Should Be Made Transparent?, 32 GOVERNANCE 565, 576-77 (2019). 
 255. This enjoyment in transgression, engaged by trolling the righteous norms of elites, is an 
example of what David Karpf identified as Trump’s supporters’ tendency to act as a weaponized, 
automated affective public—a networked public formation mobilized through sentiment. See David 
Karpf, Digital politics after Trump, ANNALS OF THE INT’L COMM. ASS’N, DOI: 
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continued to express outrage over Barack Obama’s “missing” birth 
certificate and Secretary of State Clinton’s private email server, but were 
at most apathetic about Trump’s refusal to issue his tax returns and about 
his and his administration’s efforts to control his personal and presidential 
information. His followers and most of his fellow Republicans either 
ignored the administration’s efforts to resist disclosure or affirmatively 
applauded them. 
President Trump’s embrace of a populist approach to transparency 
allows several important insights: first, about transparency’s relationship 
to populism and the resulting tensions within transparency as an 
administrative norm; and second, about the long-term effects that a 
populist leader might have on transparency’s role in a democracy.  
A. Transparency, Between Populism and Technocracy 
Transparency has always registered in a populist, moralistic voice, 
from the Progressive Era and Justice Louis Brandeis’ use of sunlight as a 
metaphor to the post-Watergate efforts to establish new open government 
mandates and strengthen existing ones.256 Its advocates promise that 
transparency can transform a distant state apart from and in opposition to 
the public into an authentically democratic one. This populist promise sits 
at the core of all manifestations of transparency as a concept. It provides 
a utopian basis for believing in the transformative potential of an 
administrative norm to enhance democracy,257 and it explains why even 
the most mainstream politicians who oppose many of populism’s 
manifestations must nevertheless embrace parts of its program.258  
Transparency and populism envision a more authentic relationship 
between the state and public, and both have no essential relationship with 
a specific political party or set of substantive ideological or policy 
commitments.  
Just as transparency incorporates populist politics, populism—even in 
 
10.1080/23808985.2017.1316675, at  4-5 (2017) (borrowing the concept of “affective publics” from ZIZI 
PAPACHARISSI, AFFECTIVE PUBLICS: SENTIMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS (2014)); see also Stolee 
& Caton, supra note 237, at 155-56, 163 (discussing trolling as a practice of provocation engaged in by 
alt-right members, Trump supporters, and Trump himself against their opposition). 
 256. See supra Part II-C. 
 257. See FENSTER, supra note 22, at 192. 
 258. See Giorgos Katsambekis, The Populist Surge in Post-Democratic Times: Theoretical and 
Political Challenges, 88 POL. Q. 202, 209 (2017). 
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its right-wing variety—includes an ideal of transparency. The latter relies 
on the direct personal connection felt between followers and leadership 
and on the ability of the leader, acting on behalf of his public, to use the 
instruments of the state to the public’s advantage.259 The people need to 
know the leader as their representative who maintains their sovereignty—
to view him and experience his presentation of an authentic self that 
represents their beliefs and their sense of the nation without mediation. 
This was the basis of Trump’s understanding of transparency as a populist 
norm. By seeing him, the people could see the state. 
But transparency, both as a concept and administrative norm, is not 
entirely a populist project, notwithstanding the historical and conceptual 
relationship between them. Administrative laws and their advocates do 
not reject or even question institutional and political pluralism; rather, 
they would require the state to inform all members of the public, majority 
and minority alike, of its operations in order to enable political contest 
among competing voices and institutional accountability. By contrast, 
populists in power view government institutions, legal mandates, and 
established, competing political parties as a hinderance to truly popular 
self-rule.260 Nor does transparency make identity claims by limiting or 
favoring its use and benefits to members by party, race, or nationality. 
Most open government laws allow anyone to request and review 
information or to attend meetings.261 Even a citizenship requirement to 
request information, which exists in some U.S. sub-federal state laws, 
draws no distinction among citizens and is easy to circumvent.262 Whereas 
 
 259. See URBINATI supra note 21, at 61. The literature on populism offers multiple characterizations 
of how populist movements view and use existing state and civil society institutions. Compare, e.g., 
Taggart, supra note 42, at 106 (“Populism has problems with institutions. At the best of times populists 
regard institutions with distaste, but at times of crisis they begin to view them as malignant.”), with 
MÜLLER, supra note 6, at 39, 44–46 (arguing that populism does not hate all institutions, so long as the 
populist leader and movement can exclusively colonize it). 
 260. See Colin Crouch, Post‐Democracy and Populism, 90 POL. Q. 124, 125 (2019). 
 261. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.§ 552(a)(3)(A) (2018) (giving access rights to “any person”). 
 262. See McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 237 (2013) (upholding against constitutional challenge 
Virginia’s law restricting the right to seek government documents to citizens of the state); Gavin Aronsen, 
This Website Will Help You Outsmart the Supreme Court’s Anti-Transparency Ruling, MOTHER JONES 
(May 1, 2013), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/supreme-court-cracks-down-public-
records-access/ (reporting on efforts to pair out-of-state requesters with citizens to cosign requests); see 
also Questions Linger over Impact of McBurney v. Young Decision, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/journals/questions-linger-over-impac/(last visited Aug. 29, 
2019), (noting that the decision’s impact would likely be mixed, as states might either underenforce 
citizenship requirement or remove it altogether). 
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transparency advocates promote laws and norms as the means for the 
public to protect itself, populist movements offer themselves as the force 
that can protect the public from the elites who currently control the state. 
Populism thus simultaneously includes and is in tension with 
transparency ideals; and transparency advocates speak in a populist 
register without necessarily viewing the state as the instrument of an 
organized elite.  
This tension is most apparent in the conflict between the concept’s 
populist  tendencies and the technical, bureaucratic tasks advocates face 
in making the state more visible263—the constitutional provisions, 
statutes, and regulations that establish the laws that impose 
transparency.264 Populist understandings of transparency and technocratic 
efforts to impose the concept conflict in their theories of governance.265 
Although both seek to establish a more accountable, representative 
state,266 the populist view embraces the personal and political while the 
technocratic view emphasizes neutrality and administration.267 To be 
imposed, the simple, visible government that a populist understanding of 
transparency holds requires a complex, technocratic set of legal and 
regulatory solutions; but the complex solutions required for visibility 
obscure the state’s simplicity and prove difficult to understand and 
enforce. Freedom of Information laws cannot simply reveal the state and 
 
 263. See Huq, supra note 25, at 1134-40 (contrasting the populist desire for a simple government 
and constitutional order with the complex nature of contemporary governance). This tension is not 
dissimilar from what Louis Michael Seidman has characterized as the “contradiction” that contemporary 
liberal constitutionalists face between their progressive embrace of government and their populist 
suspicions of it. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, WHY BERNIE IS CONFUSED: POPULIST AND PROGRESSIVE 
STRANDS IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 71-72 (SSRN working paper, June 24, 2019), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3409375. I consider this a tension rather than a contradiction because 
transparency laws and their advocates further technical mandates even as they might require or utilize 
populist political arguments. Technocratic laws and populist politics can co-exist in transparency, in other 
words, but they undercut each other and reveal the improbability of achieving one of them fully, because 
it would likely come at expense of the other. 
 264. See supra Part II-A. 
 265. See Miguel A. Centeno, The New Leviathan: the dynamics and limits of technocracy, 22 
THEORY & SOC. 307, 331 (1993). 
 266. See Christopher Bickerton & Carlo Invernizzi Accetti, Populism and Technocracy, in 
KALTWASSER ET AL (eds.), supra note 26, at 326, 329–32. 
 267. See id. For a discussion of the deterioration of administration as an ideal over the past several 
decades (and the attendant ascendancy of political powers and “governance as a concept), long predating 
the current populist wave, see PIERRE ROSANVALLON, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: IMPARTIALITY, 
REFLEXIVITY, PROXIMITY 66-69 (2011). 
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its leader without more complex rules and an additional layer of 
bureaucracy to establish and enforce administrative procedures. 
Transparency includes both populist and technocratic strains that pull in 
opposite directions and unravel each other, rendering each impossible to 
fully achieve.  
In his work on the complex role of disclosure in the relationship 
between Paraguayan campesinos and the state, the anthropologist Kregg 
Hetherington concludes, “[t]ransparency is a technocratic language built 
on the exclusion of the political from governance, which paradoxically 
requires excluded political actors to make it work.”268 This paradox 
demonstrates both the need for balancing competing conceptions of 
transparency and the implausibility of doing so. If a deeply populist form 
of transparency—whether in the Trumpian style or otherwise—is defined 
as nothing but politics and personality, then it can prove worthless, even 
obfuscatory. But if an obsession with technocratic rules and norms 
overtakes the understanding and enforcement of democratic obligations, 
then transparency serves only as a fetish object for specialists and is 
divorced from the democratic public it is intended ultimately to assist and 
serve.269  
Transparency is ultimately a “protean” concept, as David Pozen has 
characterized it,270 and for much if not most of the public constitutes an 
administrative norm of at best secondary political importance (if it is 
important at all).271 It can be articulated in some combination of technical, 
political, or populist ways at particular historical moments.272 
 
 268. See HETHERINGTON, supra note 21, at 189. 
 269. See Kregg Hetherington, Populist Transparency: The Documentation of Reality in Rural 
Paraguay, 1 J. LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 45, 47 (2008) (noting that Paraguayan populists effectively 
“couch their appeal to the masses through an appeal to experiential reality which is at odds with the 
technocratic uses of the term in transparency reforms”).  
 270. Pozen, Drift, supra note 71, at 104. 
 271. Cf. Balkin, supra note 74, at 1985-89 (criticizing progressives’ tendency to overestimate how 
much the public is interested in and follows highly technical, complex political debates). 
 272. I use the term articulation in the sense in which Stuart Hall initially developed it: 
By the term ‘articulation’, I mean a connection or link which is not necessarily given in all cases, 
as a law or a fact of life, but which requires particular conditions of existence to appear at all, 
which has to be positively sustained by specific processes, which is not ‘eternal’ but has to be 
constantly renewed, which can under some circumstances disappear or be overthrown, leading 
to the old linkages being dissolved and new connections—re-articulations—being forged. It is 
also important that an articulation between different practices does not mean that they become 
identical or that one is dissolved into the other. Each retains its distinct determinations and 
conditions of existence. 
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Transparency advocates and President Trump’s political opponents 
contest the extent of the administration’s compliance with rules and 
norms in courts, public debates, and political campaigns—in the process 
combining a technocratic critique of Trump and his administration’s 
failure to meet legal standards with a populist critique of his 
administration’s penchant for information control as a symptom of his 
corruption. Advocates who focus on expanding and enforcing 
technocratic transparency rules rightly protested when President Trump 
violated governing norms as part of the political contest over democratic 
governance. But they should not dismiss Trump and his supporters’ moral 
and populist understanding of transparency without recognizing that 
transparency’s operation and legitimacy rest on a populist politics, and 
that an emphasis on technocratic rules at the expense of populism may 
alienate or bore the public and thereby render the norm powerless. 
B.  Populism and the Potential Disfigurement of Transparency 
President Trump’s departure from existing transparency rules and 
norms—incremental differences in some respects, more brazen refusals 
to conform in others—not only represented a variance in compliance with 
open government mandates, but risked the weakening of an important, if 
second-order, democratic value. This is not a problem unique to populism, 
however. Given current levels of political partisanship in the U.S., 
transparency’s significance depends upon how it is used against a 
particular individual, party, or bureaucracy.273 Contrast, for example, the 
outrage that Republican members of Congress expressed about the 
Obama administration’s refusal to disclose documents to the investigative 
committees their party chaired to their vocal support of the Trump 
administration’s similar refusal to committees controlled by 
 
Stuart Hall, Signification, representation, ideology: Althusser and the post-structuralist debate, 2 CRIT. 
STUD. MASS COMM. 91, 113-14 n.2 (1985); see also Jennifer Daryl Slack, The theory and method of 
articulation in cultural studies, in STUART HALL: CRITICAL DIALOGUES IN CULTURAL STUDIES 112 
(Kuan-Hsing Chen & David Morley eds., 1996). 
 273. See supra Part II-B (describing the role of politics in transparency’s rise and the norm’s use as 
a weapon against political opponents).  
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Democrats274—as well as the Democrats’ parallel reversal.275 Voters and 
the broader public support a particular elected official, candidate, or party 
based more on substantive, symbolic, or partisan concerns than for fealty 
to transparency as an abstract administrative norm enforced by 
technocratic rules. Transparency is politically imposed on a political 
system; it is not surprising, therefore, that compliance with Freedom of 
Information laws matters more to the party out of power than for the 
executive against whom it is used, and that interest in compliance also 
reverses in partisan fashion when political fortunes shift. President 
Trump’s distinct relationship to transparency accentuated a phenomenon 
that has existed since the very beginning of the open government 
movement. 
The danger that all populist movements represent upon winning 
elections and assuming power is that their skepticism of pluralistic norms 
and democratic institutions ultimately disfigures those norms and 
institutions and subverts democracy.276 A purely populist understanding 
of transparency, divorced from the technocratic rules and institutional 
machinery required to force disclosure, will harm democracy and 
accountability. Notwithstanding his flaunting of disclosure norms 
regarding his financial interests, President Trump and his administration 
did not successfully destroy or abandon transparency as an administrative 
norm. They were challenged by other branches of government and the 
press in their efforts to staunch the flow of government information. At 
the same time, his emphasis on a more personal, affective notion of 
transparency via public rallies and social media threatens rebalancing 
transparency towards a populist, more explicitly political mode of 
transparency. This shift may have long-term, disfiguring effects on open 
government law and norms, and especially on executive branch 
compliance with it. 
 
 274. See JM Rieger, Then and Now: How Republicans Downplay Subpoenas When They Target 
Trump, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/22/then-now-
how-republicans-downplay-subpoenas-when-they-target-trump/ (noting Republican hypocrisy). 
 275. See Josh Gerstein, Subpoena Fight Over Operation Fast and Furious Documents Finally 
Settled, POLITICO (May 9, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/09/fast-and-furious-
documents-holder-1313120 (reporting on settlement of lawsuit between the House and Department of 
Justice over subpoenas in “Fast and Furious” gunrunning case). 
 276. Nadia Urbinati developed the argument that populism disfigures rather than destroys 
democracy. See URBINATI, ME THE PEOPLE, supra note 21, at 22; URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED: 
OPINION, TRUTH, AND THE PEOPLE 128-31 (2014). 
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